

45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 23

South Texas Law Review

Winter 2003

Symposium: Business Crimes

In Memoriam: J. Michael Bradford--1952-2003

Articles

WHISTLEBLOWER AND FEDERAL QUI TAM LITIGATION--SUING THE CORPORATION FOR FRAUD

Joel M. Androphy^{al} **Mark A. Correro**^{aa1}

Copyright (c) 2003 South Texas Law Review, Inc.; Joel M. Androphy; **Mark A. Correro**

I. Introduction	25
II. History of the False Claims Act	26
A. Lincoln's Law	26
B. The 1986 Amendments	27
III. Filing a Qui Tam Suit--The Basics	29
A. Preparing the Disclosure Statement	29
B. Filing the Complaint	31
1. Government Intervention	33
2. The Government Declines Intervention	34
IV. What Do You Have to Prove?	34
A. "Claim"	35
B. "Knowingly"	36
C. "False" or "Fraudulent"	37
V. Typical Types of Qui Tam Cases	38
A. Healthcare	38
1. Best Price	38
2. Off-Label	42
3. Facility Deficiencies	45
B. Procurement of Government Contracts	46
1. Government Loans	46
2. False Certifications	47
3. Equitable Issues	50
VI. Pitfalls	53
A. Statutory	53
1. Members of the Armed Forces	53
2. Government Employees	54
3. Public Disclosure	55
a. Administrative Proceedings	58
i. Hearings	58
ii. Documents	60
iii. Investigations	63
b. Civil Proceedings	66
i. Litigation	66
ii. Discovery	69
c. Criminal Proceedings	70
d. Legislative Issues	71
i. Documents	71
ii. Hearings	73
e. FOIA	74
f. News Media	76

g. Other Issues	76
4. Original Source	77
B. Pre-Filing Release	79
C. Constitutional	80
1. Standing	80
2. Eleventh Amendment	81
3. Take Care Clause	82
4. Eighth Amendment	84
VII. State False Claims Statutes	85
VIII. Conclusion	87

*25 Fraud and prevarication are servile vices. They sometimes grow out of the necessities, always out of the habits, of slavish and degenerate spirits It is an erect countenance, it is a firm adherence to principle, it is a power of resisting false shame and frivolous fear, that assert our good faith and honor, and assure to us the confidence of mankind.¹

I. Introduction

One day Robert Relator, formerly chief financial officer of a major corporation, walks into your office with a story about fraud against the federal government. Mr. Relator has evidence that a large government contractor has been billing the government for services not performed, double-billing the government for services rendered, and falsifying documents in order to accomplish the scheme. His story appears reliable and supported by documentation. Four questions should immediately surface in your mind: (1) What do I have to prove?, (2) What are the pitfalls?, (3) What is the potential recovery?, and (4) How do I file?

This article will assist you in answering these questions. It will guide you through the process of filing a federal qui tam action, while explaining the requirements and difficulties you may face. Part II will explain the history of the False Claims Act (“FCA”). Part III walks through the filing basics. Part IV delineates the requisite levels of proof necessary to be successful. Part V discusses some typical types of qui tam cases. Part VI examines some common pitfalls. Part VII delineates current state false claim statutes.

*26 II. History of the False Claims Act

A. Lincoln's Law

Attempting to curb a rash of fraud against the government, Congress passed a law that created incentives for private individuals to report government fraud. President Lincoln signed the law, called the False Claims Act (“FCA”), on March 2, 1863.² Also known as the “Informer's Act” or “Lincoln's Law,” the original FCA prohibited various acts designed to fraudulently obtain money from the government.³ Congress initially adopted the FCA with the intention of combating fraud against the United States Army during the Civil War.⁴ Although the legislative history of the FCA focused specifically on fraud committed by military contractors, the FCA also applied to fraud committed by all government contractors.⁵ Under the original FCA, defendants were subject to both civil and criminal penalties.⁶ There was a \$2000 fine for each fraudulent claim in addition to a penalty of double the government's actual damages.⁷ Under the 1863 FCA, private individuals known as “relators”⁸ could pursue this remedy through a “qui tam” action, and the informer was entitled to half the total recovery.⁹ The justification for allowing qui tam litigation was to encourage citizens to report wrongdoing against the government that would otherwise go unnoticed.¹⁰ In short, the *27 government hoped that economic incentives would promote private enforcement of federal legislation.¹¹

B. The 1986 Amendments

Over the years, Congress has twice amended the FCA. The most recent and extensive amendments occurred in 1986.¹² They were designed to “promote incentives for whistleblowing insiders [but also to] prevent opportunistic plaintiffs.”¹³ As one court stated, “Congress wanted to reward private individuals who take significant personal risks to bring wrongdoing to light, to break conspiracies of silence among employees of malfeasors, and to encourage whistleblowing and disclosure of fraud.”¹⁴ Although the percentage recovery provisions were reduced, the new changes as a whole created greater incentives for private citizens to “blow the whistle” against unlawful conduct. The key changes to the FCA consisted of the following: Congress reduced the potential financial recovery available to qui tam plaintiffs to between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the action if the government intervened plus reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees,¹⁵ if the government did not intervene, the qui tam plaintiff could recover between twenty-five to thirty percent of the action plus reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees.¹⁶ Congress also increased the *28 statutory penalty provisions of the FCA to a minimum of \$5000 and a maximum of \$10,000 for each violation, plus treble the government’s actual damages,¹⁷ and eliminated the old “government knowledge bar” which precluded recovery on any violation for which the government already possessed information, and instituted a “public disclosure” bar.¹⁸ Congress restored the normal civil action “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof,¹⁹ and eliminated the need to prove specific intent and made defendants liable for acting with “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the truth.²⁰ Additionally, Congress lengthened the statute of limitations from six years to a variable ten,²¹ and Congress created a cause of action for any employee who is “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment” as a result of involvement in a qui tam suit.²²

The FCA has become a strong deterrent for those who defraud the federal government. The 1986 amendments have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of qui tam actions filed and the amounts recovered by relators.²³ The price of defrauding the government is rising, the likelihood of being caught is increasing, and the consequences are more severe. The total monetary recoveries and *29 cases filed to date are outlined in the chart below.²⁴

Qui Tam Cases Filed	Total Recovered Where DOJ Intervened	Total Recovered Where DOJ Declined To Intervene
1988	60	\$355,000
1989	95	\$15 million
1990	82	\$40 million
1991	90	\$70 million
1992	119	\$134 million
1993	132	\$171 million
1994	222	\$380 million
1995	277	\$245 million
1996	363	\$125 million
1997	533	\$623 million
1998	470	\$433 million
1999	482	\$454 million
2000	367	\$1.2 billion
2001	310	\$1.2 billion
2002	320	\$1.04 billion
2003	326	\$1.48 billion
TOTAL	4248	\$7.61 billion

III. Filing a Qui Tam Suit--The Basics

A. Preparing the Disclosure Statement

The disclosure statement is perhaps the most essential document a relator prepares when initiating a qui tam suit. Section 3430(b)(2) states that a relator must provide the government with a “written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information” possessed.²⁵ The primary purpose of this requirement “is to provide the United States with enough information on the alleged fraud to be able to make a well reasoned decision on whether it should participate in the filed lawsuit, or allow the relator to proceed alone.”²⁶ The ***30** authority on exactly what the disclosure statement should contain is relatively sparse.²⁷ Some federal circuits hold that the disclosure should only recite the relevant facts,²⁸ and others hold it should also include such information as the relator's legal theories and analysis.²⁹ ***31** Generally speaking, it is not recommended that relators merely recite a general overview of the case.³⁰ The government is inundated with many promising qui tam cases, and will reject your case if there is no measurable support for your initial contentions. In that regard, unless you are in the minority, and a relator looking for the government to decline intervention, with the opportunity for a greater percentage of recovery, but with the attendant costs of litigation, be as thorough as possible with your disclosures.³¹ Whatever you decide, do not forestall filing the disclosure statement. Although investigations should be complete, disclosure statements can always be supplemented. As will be discussed, it is important to prepare the disclosure statement as soon as possible in order to be the first to file.³²

B. Filing the Complaint

Procedurally, it is advantageous to expeditiously investigate Mr. Relator's claims and file suit in federal court³³ based on two different ***32** jurisdictional bars, the first to file bar³⁴ and the public disclosure bar.³⁵ The complaint is filed in camera and is kept under seal for at least sixty days.³⁶ A relator can also proceed under one of the state qui tam statutes as a matter of pendant jurisdiction, or in the applicable state jurisdiction. Although generally discussed infra, the various state statutes are too diverse for the scope of this article.

During the sixty day time period, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has the opportunity to investigate the claim and review the supporting evidence and materials.³⁷ In practice, it is not uncommon for investigations to proceed for one to two years before the government completes its investigation and/or the court lifts the seal.³⁸ While the complaint is under seal, the DOJ can exercise a number of options. It can elect to join the lawsuit,³⁹ decline to join the lawsuit,⁴⁰ move to dismiss the action,⁴¹ or attempt to settle the action prior to a ***33** formal investigation.⁴²

1. Government Intervention

Under the statute, if the government elects to join the lawsuit, it has primary responsibility for prosecuting the case and can limit the relator's role.⁴³ However, if the government intervenes, the FCA allows the relator to continue participating in the litigation subject to certain enumerated conditions.⁴⁴ For example, the court may limit the number of witnesses the relator may call, the length of the witnesses' testimony, or the length of the relator's cross-examination.⁴⁵ All of these limitations are discretionary, and the court may impose them if the relator's participation in the case would be repetitious, irrelevant, or harassing to the government's prosecution.⁴⁶

The FCA also contains several additional provisions that limit the relator's role in the litigation. For example, the FCA allows the government to intervene in the lawsuit at any time upon a showing of “good cause.”⁴⁷ The FCA also allows the DOJ to stay discovery when the relator's actions “would interfere with the government's investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil

matter arising out of the same facts.”⁴⁸ The government is also permitted to pursue the action through an alternative remedy such as administrative relief.⁴⁹

Even if the government decides to intervene in your case, you should still fully participate in the investigation and subsequent litigation. As stated earlier, the FCA provides a relator's share of at least fifteen percent, even if you do nothing more than file the action in federal court and allow the government to prosecute your case.⁵⁰ However, it would be a financial mistake to idly sit back and watch potential monetary gain slip away.⁵¹ Congress created a large award of up to twenty-five percent for relators who actively assist in the investigation.

*34 2. The Government Declines Intervention

You should pursue your case vigorously, assuming from the start that the government is not going to intervene.⁵² Statistically, the government intervenes in approximately twenty-two percent of all qui tam cases filed.⁵³ If the government elects not to intervene, you have the right and obligation to litigate the case.⁵⁴ The government's role will then be limited to receiving copies of deposition transcripts and pleadings filed during the course of litigation.⁵⁵ However, in order to receive transcripts and pleadings, the government is required to request the documents and pay for their production.⁵⁶ When the government declines to intervene in your case, the DOJ will send you a standard declination letter outlining your duties and responsibilities in continuing the prosecution of your case. After you receive the declination letter and the seal is lifted, you have 120 days to serve the defendant.⁵⁷

IV. What Do You Have to Prove?

As a general rule, the FCA subjects an individual or company to liability for “knowingly” submitting or causing the submission of a false claim.⁵⁸ The FCA covers a broad range of misconduct potentially harmful to the federal treasury. The Supreme Court held that “the [FCA] was intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the government.”⁵⁹ The Court noted that the “statute reaches beyond ‘claims’ which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of money.”⁶⁰ Virtually all FCA cases are filed under subsections (a)(1) and (2) of § 3729.⁶¹ Regardless of what section the *35 case is brought under, all of the causes of action listed in § 3729(a) include three common elements that must be established to prove a violation under the FCA: (1) a “claim” must be presented to the government by the defendant, or the defendant must “cause” a third-party to submit a claim, (2) the claim must be made “knowingly,” and (3) the claim must be “false” or “fraudulent.”⁶²

A. “Claim”

Determining whether a “claim” has been submitted to the government can be tricky. The Supreme Court addressed the definition of “claim” under the FCA three times before the 1986 amendments. In each case, the Court strictly construed the term to encompass only those situations in which a demand or request was made for payment of money or property of the United States.⁶³ Congressional disapproval of the restricted definition led Congress to statutorily define it during the 1986 amendments:

For purposes of this section, “claim” includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.⁶⁴

Thus, a “claim” under the FCA now encompasses virtually all demands or requests that cause the disbursement of federal funds. Essentially, any action by the claimant which has the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, or any action which intentionally deprives the United States of money it is lawfully due, are properly considered “claims” within the meaning of the FCA.⁶⁵

After Congress significantly broadened the term “claim,” judicial ***36** interpretations likewise broadened. False representations of compliance with federal regulations incorporated into government contracts,⁶⁶ certifications that result in the government assuming a party's obligations,⁶⁷ false progress reports in construction contracts,⁶⁸ and proof of loss claims submitted to a federal insurance program to recover property damages⁶⁹ have all been characterized as claims under the FCA.

B. “Knowingly”

Congress added the “knowingly” provision to address the level of intent required to prove a violation.⁷⁰ Section 3729(b) now makes it clear that “no proof of specific intent to defraud” is required to prove a violation; a defendant will be liable upon demonstration that he or she “knowingly” submitted a false claim.⁷¹ “Knowingly” is defined as: (1) having “actual knowledge of the false information,” (2) “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or (3) “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”⁷² Thus, you are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to submit false claims under the FCA.⁷³ Rather, you can establish liability by simply proving deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth of the claims.⁷⁴ However, mere negligence and “innocent mistakes” are not sufficient to establish liability under the FCA.⁷⁵ A prime example of a court applying the scienter requirement is the case of *United States v. Lorenzo*.⁷⁶ In that case, Dr. Lorenzo and several other dentists were performing oral cancer screenings as part ***37** of their standard patient examinations.⁷⁷ After performing these procedures, Dr. Lorenzo and other dentists employed by his company decided to bill the cancer screenings to Medicare as “limited consultations.”⁷⁸ However, Medicare regulations specifically state that “limited consultations” do not include procedures performed during routine screenings.⁷⁹ The court held the doctors liable under the FCA because their claims were submitted in “reckless disregard” of the truth.⁸⁰ The court stated that the doctors should have known of the Medicare regulations concerning “limited consultations,” and even without that knowledge, they violated the statute.⁸¹

C. “False” or “Fraudulent”

In contrast to the terms “claim” and “knowingly,” the terms “false” and “fraudulent” are not defined in the FCA. When falsity is an issue, the question usually centers on the interpretation of a government regulation, contract, or law. Courts have held that a claim cannot be “false” if submitted pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of vague statutory language.⁸² For example, in *United States v. Adler*, the Eighth Circuit held that to be actionable a statement must be false under all reasonable interpretations.⁸³ Therefore, a defendant might defeat a finding of falsity by proving that the conduct was reasonable under at least one interpretation of the law.⁸⁴

***38 V. Typical Types of Qui Tam Cases**

A. Healthcare

In recent years, Medicare and Medicaid schemes have become the primary targets of investigations by the DOJ.⁸⁵ “The health care industry is an attractive target of fraudulent activity which, if not aggressively pursued, can have a significant detrimental effect on the financial stability of the U.S. health care system.”⁸⁶ Janet Rehnquist, Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, noted in Congressional testimony that because the department pays millions of dollars every year in fraudulent claims, health care fraud is a top priority, second only to bioterrorism.⁸⁷ The fraudulent practice of healthcare contractors can take many forms, the following three of which will be discussed in this article: best price schemes, off-label marketing, and facility deficiencies.

1. Best Price

Finding the mythical needle in a haystack is easier than discovering what the best price⁸⁸ of a drug is. The current system literally puts the entire process, practically unmonitored, into the hands of the very people who abuse the system. Federal law prescribes that drug manufacturers must pay rebates to the states to insure that the Medicaid program is receiving the best price on covered drugs. The Medicaid drug rebate process is a system consisting of five key players.⁸⁹ However, the system mainly relies *39 upon a three-way interaction between manufacturers,⁹⁰ the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”),⁹¹ and the state Medicaid agencies.⁹²

The process is a very circular system. The manufacturer provides the Best Price and Average Manufacturer Price (“AMP”) to CMS. CMS then calculates the unit rebate amount, and provides that information to the state Medicaid agency. The states then use the utilization data provided by the pharmacies, and the unit rebate amount, to calculate the rebate owed to them by the manufacturer. However, the entire system is based upon the manufacturer honestly conveying to CMS the correct Best Price and AMP. Any mistakes, intentional or unintentional, will cause an underpayment in rebate amounts.

The calculation is composed of three steps: (1) the calculation of the basic rebate, (2) the calculation of any additional rebate, and (3) calculation of the unit rebate amount. First the Basic Rebate must be calculated. The Basic Rebate is equal to the greater of AMP x 15.1% or AMP minus Best Price. AMP is the average price paid to the manufacturer (by a wholesaler) for a covered drug in the United States and distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade, after deducting customary prompt pay discounts. Calculation of AMP for any given quarter should be adjusted for all returns, rebates, charge backs, and other adjustments affecting actual price relating to sales in that quarter. CMS may permit adjustments to be made in the quarter they are realized.

Basically, AMP is calculated as net quarterly sales divided by the number of units sold. Net quarterly sales are derived after all required adjustments are made. This includes, for example, discounts, rebates for state-only programs, and breakage. Total units sold must be adjusted for returns and charge backs. If there are multiple package sizes of a product, they are combined to create a “weighted AMP.” *40 Total units sold for all package sizes are divided into total net sales dollars for all package sizes to arrive at the weighted AMP. The weighted AMP is used for all records for the same product.

All pricing is calculated by unit type. If a product is listed with a unit type (by pill or milliliter) all pricing must be that unit type. If the product is sold in a thirty milliliter tube, the pricing must be on one milliliter.

Best Price is the lowest price the manufacturer sells a covered outpatient drug to any purchaser in the United States, inclusive of cash discounts, free goods, volume discounts and rebates. The Best Price provision ensures that the government is being provided the lowest price on drugs. Like AMP, Best Price is the same across all package sizes of a product; however, it is not a weighted value.

First, the basic rebate provides for a 15.1% discount off AMP. If the manufacturer has given a customer a larger discount the government should receive the better price. The calculation of AMP/Best Price can create several miscellaneous issues. The

manufacturer may have a situation where Best Price is greater than AMP,⁹³ a zero or negative AMP,⁹⁴ no sales in a quarter,⁹⁵ no sales in the first quarter that the product is marketed,⁹⁶ or drug sales that are bundled with other products.⁹⁷

Second, any calculation of any additional rebate should be through the Consumer Price Index-Urban (“CPI-U”) limitation by *41 comparing the current quarter AMP to the baseline AMP. The baseline AMP for older products is defined as Third Quarter 1990, and for newer products, time of launch. The CPI represents changes in prices of all goods and services purchased for consumption by urban households. User fees (such as water and sewer service) and sales and excise taxes paid by the consumer are also included. Income taxes and investment items (like stocks, bonds, and life insurance) are not included. The CPI-U⁹⁸ includes expenditures by urban wage earners and clerical workers, professional, managerial, and technical workers, the self-employed, short-term workers, the unemployed, retirees, and others not in the labor force. If the current quarter AMP exceeds the baseline AMP plus the CPI-U, the excess amount becomes the additional rebate. If the current quarter AMP is equal to or lower than the baseline AMP plus the CPI-U, there is no additional rebate.

Third, a calculation is performed for the unit rebate amount (“URA”). The URA calculation is performed on a quarterly basis for each National Drug Code (“NDC”) of a covered drug. The basic rebate is added to the additional rebate, and then the rebates are divided by the per unit amount of the drug.⁹⁹ The resulting number is the URA. Finally, the URA is multiplied by the number of units dispensed to Medicaid recipients under each state participating program. The URA is calculated by CMS with AMP and Best Price data provided by the manufacturer. The number of Medicaid units dispensed is collected from retail pharmacies and submitted to manufacturers by the Medicaid state agencies.

Given the complex calculation issues, and the fact that manufacturers are given the most crucial role in the process, best price schemes are so common that it was the first health care area that Inspector Rehnquist addressed.¹⁰⁰ This is the most frequent type of health care fraud case,¹⁰¹ and has become a top priority for the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), and other health care fraud enforcement agencies. On April 28, 2003, the OIG released the final version of its Compliance Program Guidance for the Pharmaceutical Industry *42 (“Guidance”).¹⁰² The Guidance reflects the government’s continuing concern about sales and marketing practices by pharmaceutical manufacturers. Two of the major risk areas addressed in the Guidance are the integrity of data used to establish or determine government reimbursement and kickbacks.¹⁰³ The Guidance asserts that a manufacturer may be liable under the False Claims Act if: (1) government reimbursement for a product depends partly on pricing information reported directly or indirectly and (2) the manufacturer knowingly or recklessly failed to report such information completely and accurately.¹⁰⁴ Where appropriate, manufacturers’ reported prices should take into account discounts, rebates, free goods contingent on a purchase agreement, up-front payments, coupons, goods in kind, free or reduced-price services, grants, or other price concessions or similar benefits offered to purchasers.¹⁰⁵ The Guidance stressed that accurate net prices must be calculated in bundled sales, stating “any discount . . . offered on purchases of multiple products should be fairly apportioned among the products.”¹⁰⁶ While not providing instructions on calculating Medicaid rebates, the Guidance urges manufacturers to pay particular attention to calculating Average Manufacturer Price and Best Price accurately.¹⁰⁷

The second area where Best Price is used to defraud the government is with kickbacks.¹⁰⁸ The new Guidance reminds manufacturers that discounts deserve careful scrutiny particularly because of their potential to implicate the Best Price requirements of the Medicaid Rebate Program.¹⁰⁹ In addition, the Guidance highlighted the OIG’s fear that manufacturers have “a strong financial incentive to hide de facto pricing concessions” that could affect Best Price calculations and trigger increased Medicaid rebates.¹¹⁰

2. Off-Label

A burgeoning area of health-care fraud is the off-label marketing ^{*43} of prescription drugs by manufacturers. The Federal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) must approve all prescription drugs sold in the United States. Upon application, the FDA reviews a proposed drug's safety and efficacy. The FDA then will approve that drug for an indication. Once approved for a particular indication, the manufacturers must market the drug for only that use.

Problems arise when the cost of the drug far exceeds the market demand. The low demand may be due to the low occurrence of the disorder in the population. At this point, drug companies will attempt to expand the market for their product by marketing it as a treatment for disorders that are more common. The bottom line is always the same--money. Some unscrupulous drug companies will throw caution to the wind in order to recoup the tremendous amount of money that was spent on research and development. However, if a governmental Medicaid or Medicare program pays for these non-approved uses, a false claim arises.

The dissemination of information on off-label drugs must meet certain requirements.¹¹¹ A manufacturer may disseminate information concerning the safety, effectiveness, or benefit of a use not described in the approved labeling only if: (1) there is an application filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355, (2) the information meets the requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-1,¹¹² (3) the information is not derived from clinical research conducted by another manufacturer or permission has been given to use such information, (4) the manufacturer has, within sixty days before dissemination, submitted to the Secretary (A) a copy of the information to be disseminated and (B) any clinical trial information relating to the safety or effectiveness of the new use, (5) the manufacturer has complied with § 360aaa-3¹¹³ of this title, and (6) along with the information on the new use to be ^{*44} disseminated, the manufacturer includes a statement disclosing (A)(i) that the use is not approved, (ii) that the information is being disseminated at the manufacturer's expense, (iii) the names of the authors who have received compensation from the manufacturer, (iv) the official labeling for the drug, (v) a statement that there are products or treatments that have been approved for the use, (vi) identification of any person that provided funding for the research, and (B) a bibliography of other articles that have been published about the use of the drug.¹¹⁴

Failing that, the drug is misbranded. Although physicians are free to prescribe a drug for an off-label use, the FDA prohibits distribution of “misbranded” drugs, including drugs which have been distributed while accompanied by literature urging doctors to use the drugs in non-approved ways.¹¹⁵ Whether a drug is FDA-approved for a particular use will largely determine whether a prescription for that drug will be reimbursable under the Medicaid program. Reimbursement by Medicaid is, with only one rare exception, prohibited if the drug is not being used for a medically-accepted indication.¹¹⁶ Subsection (k)(6) goes on to define a medically-accepted indication as one which is approved under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.

Additionally, the FDA has published a guidance document that sets forth twelve nonexclusive factors that the FDA will consider in evaluating manufacturers' Continuing Medical Education (“CME”) activities and determining the independence of those activities.¹¹⁷ The factors are: (1) the degree of control the manufacturer has in the content of the presentation and the selection of moderators, (2) the extent to which the manufacturer has disclosed its financial relationship with the presentation, (3) the focus of the program, (4) the relationship between the CME provider and the supporting company, (5) the extent of provider involvement in sales or marketing, (6) the provider's failure to meet standards of scientific rigor, (7) the number of repeat presentations of the same material, (8) whether invitations or mailing lists were generated by the sales or marketing department, (9) the opportunity for meaningful discussion, (10) whether the information was disseminated after the initial program, (11) the extent of promotional activities at the event, and ^{*45} (12) any complaints raised by the provider, presenters, or attendees regarding attempts by the supporting company to influence the content.¹¹⁸

Basically, once the FDA approves a drug for a certain use, it must be promoted by the manufacturer for that use, not a financially preferred use. For example, assume a drug manufacturer ABC Pharmaceuticals Inc., obtained a FDA indication for the use of X-CREAM to treat a rare skin disorder. Even though that market is very small, ABC must promote X-CREAM for the treatment of only that skin disorder. If a physician wanted to prescribe X-CREAM for the treatment of a very common allergic reaction, then he is free to do that. However, ABC may not freely promote X-CREAM as a treatment for the allergic reaction, because

that is not what it is indicated to treat. If in conversations with drug representatives, the physician first asks about alternative uses for X-CREAM, then ABC may, under the above conditions, briefly discuss other studies. However, the studies that ABC uses must meet the above requirements. The same is true in a CME setting. ABC must meet the above requirements, or it may only promote X-CREAM for the treatment of the skin disorder--regardless of how much the drug cost to develop or how small the skin disorder market.

3. Facility Deficiencies

Long-term health care facilities will either be too aggressive in patient treatment or deny the essential medical care in order to increase their profits.¹¹⁹ Although prescribing unnecessary treatment is prohibited, many reported schemes are also accomplished “by ordering fewer tests, using fewer supplies, employing less staff and reducing referrals to specialists.”¹²⁰ The courts have found that these tactics violate the Nursing Home Reform Act, the Social Security Act, and Medicare/Medicaid laws.¹²¹

In *Aranda*, the government alleged that a long-term psychiatric facility did not take enough precautions to ensure patient safety.¹²² “[A]ppropriate precautions were not taken and . . . physical injury to and sexual abuse of patients occurred because of inadequate *46 conditions, such as understaffed shifts, lack of monitoring equipment, and inappropriate housing assignments.”¹²³ The court found that this conduct violated Medicaid and constituted a false claim.¹²⁴

B. Procurement of Government Contracts

As previously noted, the FCA was first launched to combat fraud perpetrated by underhanded government contractors during the Civil War.¹²⁵

The statute was originally adopted following a series of sensational congressional investigations into the sale of provisions and munitions to the War Department. Testimony before Congress painted a sordid picture of how the United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war. Congress wanted to stop the plundering of the public treasury.¹²⁶

It is not surprising that these continue to be areas of great concern for the federal government. Just as the United States has experienced vast economic and industrial growth since the Civil War, so too has it experienced a greater demand for competent contractors. Problems have arisen, however, in that simple contracts for food or supplies have given way to complex commercial transactions for the procurement of an enormous array of goods and services. As these contracts become more complex, the fraudulent schemes of greedy contractors become more subtle. At times it is difficult even for an experienced attorney to evaluate how a particular scheme constitutes fraud so as to fall under the FCA. Two examples of how contractors have bilked the federal government are: lying on applications to get federal loans, and falsely certifying compliance with government contracts.

1. Government Loans

The United States Supreme Court in *Neifert-White* first addressed the question: “Does the False Claims Act reach ‘claims’ for favorable action by the government upon applications for loans or is it [strictly] confined to ‘claims’ for payments due and owing from the *47 government?”¹²⁷ In *Neifert-White*, the question presented to the Supreme Court was “whether the [FCA] applies to the supplying of false information in support of an application to a federal agency, the Commodity Credit Corporation (“CCC”), for a loan.”¹²⁸ Previously, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit had held that a loan is not covered under the FCA.¹²⁹ Both courts reasoned that a loan is not covered under the term “claim” as defined by the FCA.¹³⁰ In overturning both courts, the Supreme Court held that the term “claim” as used in the FCA should not be given a narrow reading, and should be

read to reach all fraudulent attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of money.¹³¹ The FCA will not apply, however, if the government is merely a guarantor and not the lender. Guarantying a loan only creates an inchoate offense, and a false claim will not result until there is a claim for payment from the government.¹³²

2. False Certifications

A false certification occurs when the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon the certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation. The claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim within the meaning of the FCA when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.¹³³ For example, in *Thompson*, the relator alleged that:

as a condition of their participation in the Medicare program, defendants were required to certify in annual cost reports that the services identified therein were provided in compliance with the laws and regulations regarding the provision of healthcare services. He further alleged that defendants falsely certified that the services identified in their annual cost reports were provided in compliance with such laws and regulations. Thus, *Thompson* *48 fairly alleged that the government's payment of Medicare claims is conditioned upon certification of compliance with the laws and regulations regarding the provision of healthcare services, including the anti-kickback statute and the Stark laws, and that defendants submitted false claims by falsely certifying that the services identified in their annual cost reports were rendered in compliance with such laws and regulations.¹³⁴ These certifications can either be express or implied, depending on which circuit the qui tam complaint is filed.¹³⁵ Generally speaking, if the contract certifies compliance and the compliance was a condition of payment, then there is a false claim.¹³⁶

However, if the government knew about the false claim, continued making payments to the contractor, and failed to pursue a contractual remedy, then the false certification cannot give rise to a qui tam action.¹³⁷ In *Southland*, the defendant contracted with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to provide low-cost housing.¹³⁸ The contract required HUD to make monthly assistance payments that were conditioned on the defendants' certification that the property was “to the best of [their] knowledge and belief . . . in decent, safe, and sanitary condition.”¹³⁹ If HUD, during its yearly inspections, found that the property was not in satisfactory condition, it could have given written notice of the violation and, if corrective action was not taken, declared a default and foreclose on the property.¹⁴⁰ From 1981 until 1992, the property passed annual HUD inspections.¹⁴¹ However, in August 1993, HUD *49 reported that repair and maintenance to the property was urgently needed.¹⁴² By 1995, HUD's report indicated that the continued deterioration of the property might jeopardize the subsidy payments.¹⁴³ From 1996 until 1997, HUD continued to find problems and urged corrective action.¹⁴⁴ Unable to comply, the defendants finally turned over the property to HUD, and it was auctioned in July 1998.¹⁴⁵ Following the sale, the government initiated a qui tam suit to recover all the subsidy payments it made between 1995 and 1997.¹⁴⁶ The government argued that the payments were false because the defendants had certified that the property was in decent, safe, and sanitary condition.¹⁴⁷

The court reviewed the current law on contract issues, the FCA statutory requirement of “knowingly false,” and a new judicially imposed FCA requirement that the false claim be “material.”¹⁴⁸ As discussed supra, the FCA has three statutory requirements in order for a claim to be actionable.¹⁴⁹ There must be a “claim,” that is made “knowingly,” and that is “false.” Statutorily these are the only requirements. However, the circuits are split on whether or not there is a fourth requirement that the claim must also be “material” to the government's decision to pay.¹⁵⁰ After a long discussion, the *Southland* court concluded that “there should no longer be any doubt that materiality is an element of a civil False Claims Act case.”¹⁵¹ The court then pronounced that the certifications that the property was in *50 decent, safe, and sanitary condition were not material.¹⁵² Although the court stated that false certifications could be material, they were not in this case because HUD never invoked any contractual

remedy and continued making payments “irrespective of their compliance with the decent, safe and sanitary standard.”¹⁵³ Also, the evidence did not suggest the government “took the truth or falsity of the defendants' certifications into account” when it decided to pay.¹⁵⁴ The court then decided that a “knowingly” false claim could not be submitted if the government knew the claims were false and paid anyway.¹⁵⁵ Finally, the court decided that since HUD never ceased to make payments, pursuant to its contractual right, no false claim could exist.¹⁵⁶

3. Equitable Issues

Often a question arises as to whether a false claimant is entitled *51 to any retention of funds under the contract, especially if there was a benefit conferred on the government. More importantly, as relator's counsel, do you invest time and money to pursue a false claim's case if there is some indication that the defendant is entitled to some equitable remedy? The analysis will then generally involve whether the contract is void or voidable. The Godley court discussed the difference between contracts that are void and voidable.¹⁵⁷ A contract where the contractor is without knowledge of any wrongdoing is voidable, and a contract that is tainted with fraud known to the contractor is void ab initio.¹⁵⁸ The defendant may have some equitable claim to relief despite his false assertions.¹⁵⁹ The general rule is that a government contract tainted by fraud or wrong-doing is void ab initio.¹⁶⁰ The Godley court stated:

A contract without the taint of fraud or wrongdoing, however, does not fall within this rule. Illegal acts by a Government contracting agent do not alone taint a contract and invoke the void ab initio rule. Rather, the record must show some causal link between the illegality and the contract provisions. Determining whether illegality taints a contract involves questions of fact.

An example of a contract being void ab initio is when a government contractor lies about being a small business in order to procure a government contract.¹⁶¹ The J.E.T.S. court stated the contract was acquired by, and therefore infused with fraud.¹⁶² “J.E.T.S. *52 obtained this contract by knowingly falsely stating that it was a small business. Had it stated the truth about its size, it would not have received the contract.”¹⁶³ The court pronounced that when a government contract is tainted from the beginning by fraud, it is void ab initio.¹⁶⁴

The court outlined the purpose of the Small Business Act.¹⁶⁵ According to the court, the Small Business Act's purpose is to set aside certain government contracts for businesses that are independently owned and are not dominant in their respective fields.¹⁶⁶ A business's annual receipts determine whether it is small.¹⁶⁷ The court concluded that J.E.T.S., a food service contractor, had falsely certified to the Air Force that it was small when in actuality it was not; therefore, it would have never received the contract had it been truthful from the start.¹⁶⁸ On the question of whether to allow J.E.T.S. to recover for services that it had rendered, the court stated “to permit recovery of any further monies under the circumstances would be an affront to the integrity of the federal procurement process.”¹⁶⁹

Once a contract is tainted by fraud and void ab initio, the appropriate remedy is forfeiture.¹⁷⁰ The Brown court, in deciding damages, stated:

The Government is also entitled to relief in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1988). That statute directs the forfeiture of a claim against the United States “by any person who corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance [of such claim].” This statute has been held to require the forfeiture of any claim affected by fraud, whether intrinsic to the claim or in the presentment of the claim. [Kamen Soap Prods. Co. v. United States](#), 129 Ct. Cl. 619, 641, 124 F. Supp. 608, 620 (1954) (“this statute goes further than merely banning fraudulent claims. It provides for a forfeiture of the claim if any fraud is practiced or attempted to be practiced in proving, establishing or allowing a claim.”). The Court of *53 Claims has ruled that where fraud is committed in the course of a contract

to which the suit pertains, it may not isolate the affected part and allow suit to proceed on the remainder. The practice of a fraud on part of a contract condemns the whole. The rule is set out in [Little v. United States](#), 138 Ct. Cl. 773, 778, 152 F. Supp. 84, 87-88 (1957): It is true that the forfeiture statute [28 U.S.C. § 2514] was not intended to forfeit an otherwise valid claim of a claimant merely because, in some other unrelated transaction, he had defrauded the Government. But where, as in the present case, fraud was committed in regard to the very contract upon which the suit is brought, this court does not have the right to divide the contract and allow recovery on part of it. Since plaintiff's claims are based entirely upon contract V3020V-241, a contract under which he practiced fraud against the Government, all of his claims under that contract will be forfeited pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2514. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2514 requires the forfeiture of all claims arising under a contract tainted by fraud against the Government. See also [New York Mkt. Gardeners' Ass'n v. United States](#), 43 Ct.Cl. 114, 136 (1908).¹⁷¹

VI. Pitfalls

A. Statutory

1. Members of the Armed Forces

If the qui tam relator happens to be a former or present member of the armed forces, potential problems arise because the FCA prohibits “former or present members of the Armed Forces [from asserting FCA claims] against [another] member of the Armed Forces.”¹⁷² However, this section does not prevent an armed service relator from bringing a qui tam action against a government contractor.¹⁷³ The relator in [Williams](#), an attorney for the United States Air Force, learned of a bid rigging scheme by a *54 telecommunications company that sought to procure contracts with the United States.¹⁷⁴ Williams filed a qui tam action against the contractor, and the United States attempted to have the action dismissed by arguing that Williams should be barred as a qui tam relator because he uncovered the fraud as a result of his employment with the Air Force.¹⁷⁵ The court noted that the 1986 amendments to the FCA allow “any private ‘person’ the right to bring a civil action under the Act, subject only to four specific exceptions.”¹⁷⁶ Since the FCA does not specifically exclude members of the armed forces from bringing qui tam suits against government contractors, the court found that Williams' qui tam action was not barred.¹⁷⁷ Because a member of the armed forces is also a governmental employee, one should be prepared for the challenge that his claim is barred because of his status as government employee.

2. Government Employees

It is no surprise that the case law is somewhat amorphous concerning the ability of government employees to bring FCA actions.¹⁷⁸ There is however, no per se exclusion of governmental employees from bringing a qui tam actions.¹⁷⁹ Government employees will only be disqualified as qui tam relators if they fall within one of *55 the four categories of plaintiffs enumerated in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e).¹⁸⁰ Some courts use the fourth exclusion, section 3730(e)(4) which is the public disclosure bar, to preclude governmental employees from bringing qui tam suits.¹⁸¹ This reasoning is based on the assumption that “government employees maintain a dual status--arms of the government while at work, private citizens while not at work--a ‘public disclosure’ necessarily occurs whenever a government employee uses government information he learned on the job to file a qui tam suit in his private capacity.”¹⁸² However, generally speaking, as long as the governmental employee is not bringing an action against members of Congress, judges, or senior members of the executive branch, they are proper relators.¹⁸³

3. Public Disclosure

As mentioned earlier, the 1986 amendments to the FCA enlarged *56 the ambit of the FCA by allowing a relator, in certain circumstances, to file a suit based on information that the government already had in its possession.¹⁸⁴ To ensure the

broader grant of prosecutorial authority did not cause “parasitic lawsuits,” Congress created a jurisdictional bar to a relator bringing an action “based upon” information defined as “publicly disclosed,” unless the relator is the “original source” of the information.¹⁸⁵ To constitute public disclosure, courts have held that the disclosure must reveal allegations of fraud or the fraudulent nature of the transactions involved.¹⁸⁶ Mere disclosure of the general subject matter of the fraudulent conduct will be insufficient to trigger the exception.¹⁸⁷

In practice, the public disclosure bar is one of the most difficult concepts for practicing attorneys. The reason for this difficulty arises from the disparate treatment the section receives from the various circuit courts. In some cases, the circuits diverge in their analysis of the public disclosure bar so dramatically that they cannot even agree as to whether it is a substantive or jurisdictional concept.¹⁸⁸ This article will give a general overview of the bar. Practitioners are urged to review the law in their respective circuits.

The statute specifically limits the types of “public disclosures” to those made in criminal, civil, or administrative hearings, in congressional, administrative, or General Accounting Office reports, *57 or from the news media.¹⁸⁹ “Hearing” encompasses both civil complaints and criminal indictments.¹⁹⁰ Although the majority of courts have held this list to be exhaustive,¹⁹¹ courts are divided as to the definition of these categories.¹⁹² The more expansively a court interprets these types of disclosures, the more likely the jurisdictional bar will apply to your case. If, however, the terms are narrowly construed, the applicability of the jurisdictional bar is restricted. This of course will depend on which jurisdiction your case is in and how that circuit defines the term “public disclosure.”¹⁹³

*58 a. Administrative Proceedings

i. Hearings

The manner in which a court defines an “administrative hearing” will determine the scope of its analysis in applying the public disclosure bar. The Ninth Circuit, in *A-1 Ambulance Service*, held that disclosures made during a competitive bidding process constituted “administrative hearings” and thus were public disclosures that barred jurisdiction.¹⁹⁴ After A-1's unsuccessful bid to become the exclusive emergency EMS provider in two California counties, it filed a qui tam suit alleging violations of the Medicare Act's anti-kickback provisions.¹⁹⁵ Basically, A-1 contended that the cost of providing ambulance services to indigents was being unlawfully shifted to third parties.¹⁹⁶ A-1 argued the counties refused to reimburse the ambulance services for the transportation cost of indigents.¹⁹⁷ As a result, the companies awarded the ambulance service contracts were unlawfully inflating their costs to Medicare patients to offset losses on the transportation of indigents.¹⁹⁸ In the end, the companies were fraudulently compelling Medicare “to subsidize ambulance services at ‘exorbitant’ rates for indigent patients who are otherwise ineligible for Medicare benefits.”¹⁹⁹ The court found that the claims of fraud were previously publicly disclosed in “administrative hearings.”²⁰⁰ In essence, two public meetings were held in contemplation of the service contracts that revealed “the issues of Medicare *59 reimbursement” and the “subsidy for uncollectible ambulance services.”²⁰¹ The court noted three reasons for its conclusion. First, the competitive bidding process involved several administrative proceedings involving each county's board of supervisors.²⁰² Second, those proceedings were open to the public, and invited public comment.²⁰³ Finally, the records of each of those proceedings were recorded and distributed as public records.²⁰⁴ “Thus, in light of the numerous agency proceedings held by the Counties and the inherently public nature of the bidding process . . . [the court was] compelled to conclude that public disclosure occurred in this case through administrative hearings.”²⁰⁵

In another opinion, the Ninth Circuit also found that disclosures in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) proceeding were “administrative hearings” that triggered the FCA's public disclosure bar.²⁰⁶ The relator in *Hagood*, a former

Army Corps of Engineers employee, alleged that the Water Springs Dam project was based on a fixed repayment schedule that violated the Water Supply Act.²⁰⁷ However, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the allegations of fraud had been disclosed previously in a proceeding between the City of Ukiah and the FERC.²⁰⁸ The City of Ukiah "submitted a petition for rehearing [to the FERC] which alleged that the fixed repayment schedule . . . violated the Water Supply Act."²⁰⁹ The court noted that Ukiah had all but accused the Water Agency of fraud in the FERC proceeding, and since the proceeding before the FERC was "administrative," public disclosure had occurred.²¹⁰

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of "administrative hearing," at least one district court has used a more narrow approach. The Garibaldi court held that since a school board meeting was not one of the enumerated areas of § 3730(e)(4), information disclosed would not constitute public disclosure.²¹¹ *60 Garibaldi, a director of the Audit Department of the Orleans Parish School Board, alleged that the school board overcharged federal unemployment and worker's compensation programs.²¹² Garibaldi reported these violations to his superiors and a meeting of the school board was held to discuss them.²¹³ The board meeting was open to the public, and included an audit report of an independent company, which concluded that no violations had occurred.²¹⁴ However, to constitute public disclosures the "allegations and transactions alleged . . . must have been disclosed" in one of the sources as defined in the statute.²¹⁵ Since an "administrative hearing" is an adversarial process, a school board meeting would not qualify.²¹⁶ Unlike a civil trial, the school board meeting did not assure due process and counsel representation.²¹⁷ The court pointed out that the purpose of the meeting was merely to present the school board's one-sided view that it had not violated any provisions of the FCA.²¹⁸

Clearly, this court diverges from the Ninth Circuit's broad reading of "administrative hearing." The Ninth Circuit focuses on the information being in the public record, while the Garibaldi court focuses on a strict reading of the statute, and examines the nature and purpose of the particular proceeding. If the proceeding does not resemble an adversarial hearing, it cannot be an "administrative hearing."

ii. Documents

Some courts do not focus on the particular proceeding at issue, and instead focus on the type of document disclosed. In a situation similar to *A-1 Ambulance Service*, an unsuccessful bidder's attorney for a government contract filed a qui tam action in Grayson. The Grayson court held that the information was publicly disclosed because documents filed with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") were not under seal, and were available upon request from the FAA.²¹⁹ During the bidding process for a Global Positioning *61 System contract, AMTI represented to the government that if it were awarded the contract it would employ the technically qualified experts of Overlook Systems Technology, Inc. ("Overlook").²²⁰ AMTI was awarded the contract; however, it never hired Overlook.²²¹ The relators in Grayson, were attorneys that had represented the two unsuccessful bidders during administrative proceedings with the FAA.²²² They alleged that AMTI's behavior amounted to no more than a "bait and switch" scheme.²²³ However, the relators admitted that they first learned of the "bait and switch" from the complaint filed with the FAA.²²⁴ The court had no trouble concluding that the FCA barred the attorney's qui tam case. "We . . . construe 'administrative hearing' to include the filing of an administrative complaint. Where, as in this case, the filing was not under seal and the document was available upon request to the FAA, the allegations contained . . . were publicly disclosed."²²⁵

The Ninth Circuit in *Hochman* found that allegations of fraud, previously investigated by the Inspector General ("IG"), did not raise the "public disclosure" bar.²²⁶ Both relators in *Hochman* were physicians at the Veterans Health Administration ("VHA").²²⁷ They alleged that the "defendants submitted inaccurate attendance records for . . . the physicians, thereby charging the government for time that the physicians did not spend at the Clinic."²²⁸ The IG had previously investigated the Clinic

for the same allegations, and concluded they were unsubstantiated.²²⁹ The defendants relied on the Inspector General Act, requiring the IG to give Congress semiannual reports and statements that summarize investigational findings.²³⁰ The court found that the IG had released its semiannual report, but did not include its findings.²³¹ The court distinguished Hochman from an earlier case stating: “In *Fine* the plaintiff conceded that the contents of the report at issue were detailed in the IG’s publicly disclosed semiannual statement. Here, the district court found that the IG’s publicly disclosed *62 semiannual statement did not contain the information gathered in the IG’s . . . report.”²³²

The Tenth Circuit, in *Fine* concluded that a document such as a memorandum sent to “any member of the public not previously informed” of the fraud would also constitute “public disclosure.”²³³ In *Fine*, a former Office of Inspector General employee, acting as a relator, accused Advanced Sciences, a federal contractor, of submitting claims for unallowable costs.²³⁴ While employed with the OIG, *Fine* prepared a memorandum containing his allegations of fraud and requested an audit.²³⁵ However, due to increasing tensions between himself and the OIG, *Fine* also sent the memorandum to his age discrimination representative at the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”).²³⁶ He also provided the memorandum to an accounting firm to solicit their opinion.²³⁷ After he filed a qui tam action, the court relied on *Ramseyer* and held “that public disclosure occurs when the allegations of fraud or fraudulent transactions upon which the qui tam suit is based are affirmatively disclosed to members of the public who are otherwise strangers to the fraud.”²³⁸ Since the AARP representative and the accountant were “members of the public not previously informed” of the fraud, the memorandum constituted public disclosure.²³⁹

A District of Columbia court has also held that if an OIG audit report contains “allegations or transactions” of the fraud, it would constitute public disclosure.²⁴⁰ In *Schwedt*, an audit report prepared by the OIG and reviewed by an outside accounting firm documented that a government contractor had “submitted flawed products while certifying their completeness, and alleged that in one case [the contractor] was aware that the product was not compliant.”²⁴¹ The *63 court found that the report, on its face, “contained a ‘substantial . . . indication of foul play.’”²⁴² The court held that the qui tam suit, “as a matter of law is ‘based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions,’ and thus is barred.”

Along with OIG audit reports, Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCAA”) reports have been held by the Southern District of Texas to raise the public disclosure bar.²⁴³ In *Wercinski*, two relators who were auditors for the DCAA accused IBM of increasing “its overall profits by recovering costs of leasing space in a building it already owned.”²⁴⁴ While working for the DCAA, the relators investigated IBM for this conduct and prepared an audit report that detailed the alleged fraud.²⁴⁵ The reports were divulged to the House of Representatives, reported in the *Los Angeles Times*, and provided to McDonnell Douglas in another matter.²⁴⁶ The court concluded:

Contrary to Relators’ assertions, this Court finds that information exposing both the fraudulent transaction and the allegation of fraud have been publicly disclosed on several different occasions. The very essence of the fraud charges against IBM--that IBM had billed the government for leasing space in an office building it owned--was specifically mentioned by both Dingell and Thibault in their published remarks. Moreover, the details of IBM’s alleged wrongdoing, including information regarding IBM’s misclassification of its lease with Middlebrook Associates which enabled it to bill for costs otherwise not properly chargeable to the government, were provided to McDonnell Douglas in a report prepared by DCAA.²⁴⁷

iii. Investigations

Administrative investigations generally lead to public disclosures. For example, the Seventh Circuit in *Farmington* held that information that was disclosed to the Federal Farmers’ Home Administration (“FmHA”) was public disclosure, barring the

qui tam action.²⁴⁸ In Farmington, Eunice Mathews personally guaranteed a \$100,000 line *64 of credit extended to her son from the Bank of Farmington.²⁴⁹ However, the bank loaned him over \$290,000 which he used in connection with his farm operation.²⁵⁰ After the bank found itself undersecured, it sought an additional guaranty from the FmHA.²⁵¹ However, contrary to federal law, when the bank applied to the FmHA, it did not disclose the guaranty of Eunice Mathews.²⁵² Following the son's default, the bank submitted, and was paid on, two loss reports submitted to the FmHA.²⁵³ The bank subsequently sued Eunice Mathews on her guaranty.²⁵⁴

Mathews's attorney tried unsuccessfully to plead the bank's concealment of the mother's guaranty as a defense during the state court action.²⁵⁵ "A loan officer at the bank, Mr. Rich Kimbrell, told [Eunice] Mathews's attorney that the Mathews's guaranty had not been disclosed on the FmHA application, but that it was in . . . [her son's] file at the Bank and would have been reviewed periodically by the FmHA."²⁵⁶ During the course of the state court action, Eunice Mathews's attorney subpoenaed Mr. Victor Rhea, the FmHA employee responsible for the loan at the time.²⁵⁷ Upon receipt of the subpoena, Mr. Rhea contacted the bank and was told, for the first time, about the Mathews's guaranty.²⁵⁸ The court held that since Mr. Rhea was directly responsible for the supervision of these particular loans, public disclosure occurred when the bank confessed their misrepresentations to him over the telephone.²⁵⁹ The court found this telephone conversation an "administrative investigation" under the FCA.²⁶⁰ The court determined that "[i]f the disclosure is made, as here, to precisely the public official responsible for the claim, it need not be disclosed to anyone else to be public disclosure within the meaning" of the FCA.²⁶¹

This reading of the FCA by the court is grounded in the Seventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of the public disclosure bar--bringing *65 the fraud to the attention of the proper authorities.²⁶² The court would not have found public disclosure had the information been disclosed to someone without the ability to intervene on behalf of the government.²⁶³ If, for example, the information would have been disclosed to a "postal carrier or to the Governor of Guam," no public disclosure would have occurred in this case.²⁶⁴ This interpretation is at considerable odds with other circuits that apply the public disclosure bar to instances of disclosure to "any single member of the public not previously informed thereof."²⁶⁵

The Ninth Circuit has also addressed whether internal investigations constitute administrative investigations, and hence instruments of public disclosure. In Aflatooni, the circuit court concluded that a subcontractor's own internal investigation would not constitute an "administrative investigation" so as to raise the public disclosure bar.²⁶⁶ Kitsap Physicians Service ("KPS") employed Dr. Aflatooni to provide medical services.²⁶⁷ KPS subcontracted to the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") to administer the Medicare Part B program in certain regions of Washington State.²⁶⁸ Dr. Aflatooni alleged in his qui tam action that some doctors were altering patient billing records.²⁶⁹ Specifically, Dr. Matan, a physician employed by Pathology Associates of Kitsap County ("PAKC"), had reported his partner, Dr. Hallman, to the KPS board of directors for suspected billing irregularities.²⁷⁰ The board employed its outside counsel to investigate the allegations.²⁷¹ An extensive internal investigation was conducted, however, no action was taken and the results were never reported.²⁷² Dr. Aflatooni alleged in his qui tam that doctors Matan and Hallman submitted false claims to the Medicare program and that KPS covered up the fraud.²⁷³ The court considered whether the internal investigation of PAKC amounted to an "administrative investigation."²⁷⁴ The Ninth Circuit concluded "that *66 the internal investigation of PAKC Defendants conducted by KPS's own lawyer did not constitute an 'administrative investigation' within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A)."²⁷⁵ The court reasoned "KPS's investigation amounted to a self-inquiry into alleged fraud of its own board member, not an institutional inquiry of the kind contemplated by the statute."²⁷⁶ Therefore, the qui tam was not barred based on that disclosure.²⁷⁷

The Southern District of New York, in Phipps, recently barred a qui tam action based on an "administrative investigation" by the Department of Health.²⁷⁸ The relator in Phipps alleged "that certain relatives of [the] defendants . . . received benefits

from the Women, Infants, and Children (“WIC”) program that they were not eligible to receive.”²⁷⁹ Prior to Phipps's suit, the New York State Department of Health (“DOH”) began investigating “whether people had improperly enrolled into the WIC program.”²⁸⁰ Phipps admitted that some of the allegations in her qui tam were the result of disclosures made to her by the DOH during its “administrative investigation.”²⁸¹ The court concluded “[t]he DOH in this case divulged the allegations of fraud and therefore the allegations were publicly disclosed.”²⁸²

b. Civil Proceedings

i. Litigation

The area of prior litigation is full of mines that unsuspecting qui tam plaintiffs should carefully navigate. Prior litigation comes in many forms, each requiring special attention to the way a particular circuit analyzes the public disclosure bar. At the outset, it should be reiterated that the starting point for determining whether a particular litigation document can constitute public disclosure should always be the statutory text of the FCA. Prior “civil litigation” is not among the list of items in § 3730(e)(4)(A).²⁸³ However, courts have recognized *67 that the term “civil hearing” enumerated in the FCA properly includes general civil litigation.²⁸⁴ Therefore, a broad range of documents from civil complaints to criminal indictments have been held to constitute public disclosure.²⁸⁵

Sometimes disclosure occurs in a civil context. When this happens the critical inquiry is how broad the court defines the term “civil hearing.” Siller held that an entire civil proceeding, or any portion thereof, constitutes a “hearing” under the FCA, and will bar qui tam actions that result from such information.²⁸⁶ Siller brought a qui tam suit against Becton Dickinson & Company (“Becton”) for overcharging the government for health care products.²⁸⁷ At the time, Siller was working for Scientific Supply, Inc. (“SSI”), a seller of medical supplies supplied by Becton.²⁸⁸ Becton canceled SSI's distributorship contract and SSI filed a contract action against them.²⁸⁹ “The thrust of SSI's complaint was that [Becton] canceled SSI's distributorship because it feared that SSI . . . would disclose that [Becton] was overcharging the government.”²⁹⁰ Following a settlement agreement, Siller filed a qui tam action against Becton based on the alleged overcharges.²⁹¹ According to the court, dismissal of Siller's qui tam would be proper if the SSI suit's disclosure of these allegations *68 constituted a public disclosure in a civil hearing. The court stated “that any information disclosed through civil litigation and on file with the clerk's office should be considered a public disclosure of allegations in a civil hearing for purposes” of the FCA.²⁹² Siller unsuccessfully argued that “hearing” as used in the FCA does not include merely filing a complaint.²⁹³ Most circuits agree that filings in prior civil proceedings will constitute public disclosure.

In Koch, a relator brought a qui tam action asserting that “by deliberate and systematic mismeasurement” the defendants “stole crude oil and natural gas from Federal and Indian lands.”²⁹⁴ Mr. Koch, Precision's majority shareholder, had already filed three civil suits against the defendants alleging that this conduct also constituted RICO violations.²⁹⁵ The court held that since the allegations in the qui tam were substantially similar to the allegations in the prior civil litigation, public disclosure had occurred,²⁹⁶ and his qui tam suit was dismissed.²⁹⁷

Additionally, courts have held that prior civil litigation documents will support public disclosure, even if they were filed in state court proceedings.²⁹⁸ In Federal Recovery Services, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior filing in Louisiana state court supported public disclosure, and barred a qui tam action.²⁹⁹ Quoting Siller, the court held that “any information disclosed through civil litigation and on file with the clerk's office should be considered a public disclosure of allegations in a civil hearing for purposes of section 3730(e)(4)(A).”³⁰⁰

Even if there is prior litigation, some courts hold that in order for the litigation to raise the public disclosure bar, the allegations in the qui tam suit must be similar to the allegations in the prior lawsuit.³⁰¹ *69 Therefore, when researching Mr. Relator's FCA claims, the qui tam attorney should peruse all publicly filed documents from prior lawsuits in order to determine if there has been public disclosure, the content of the information, and the best forum for the litigation.

ii. Discovery

Some courts hold that disclosure of discovery material to a party who is not under any court-imposed limitation as to its use (such as a protective order) is a public disclosure.³⁰² Discovery material filed with the court, and not subject to protective order, is considered publicly disclosed in a civil hearing (which is roughly synonymous with a proceeding) for purposes of the jurisdictional bar of 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A).³⁰³ However, some courts hold that discovery material that “has not been filed with the court, and is only theoretically available upon the public's request,” is not “publicly disclosed” within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).³⁰⁴

*70 The most instructive case on point is *Pentagen*. In *Pentagen*, the defendant, CACI, moved for dismissal of *Pentagen*'s amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 3730(e)(4) of the False Claims Act, because *Pentagen*'s allegations were based on information publicly disclosed by CACI or third parties in a deposition from *Runaway Development Group v. Pentagen Technologies, Inc.*³⁰⁵ The court held that “because the evidence reveals that *Pentagen* must have learned of some of the elements of its qui tam allegation from the RDG I deposition,” public disclosure had occurred.³⁰⁶

c. Criminal Proceedings

Can a qui tam relator bring suit from information gleaned from a criminal indictment? Although there would appear to be a statutory bar, one of the few courts to address the issue has been answered in the affirmative.³⁰⁷ Two months following the intervention in a qui tam *71 suit, the government filed a criminal indictment that included different factual allegations.³⁰⁸ The relator amended his complaint to include these new allegations.³⁰⁹ *Northrop* alleged that the amended complaint was barred because the new allegations were publicly disclosed in the criminal indictment.³¹⁰ The Ninth Circuit held that “if the government's disclosure of the [new allegation] was the result of a criminal investigation that was instigated as a consequence of the information [the relator] provided to the government, it could not be used to bar the qui tam.”³¹¹ Basically, if the relator supplies the government with information of a specific fraud, and the government uses that information to form the basis of a criminal indictment, then the criminal indictment will not trigger the public disclosure bar.³¹²

d. Legislative Issues

i. Documents

In some instances, courts have classified documents as legislative, and unlike Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) reports or audits, legislative documents are not specifically enumerated under § 3730(e)(4)(A) as constituting public disclosure.³¹³ Based on a purely textual interpretation, they should not support a defensive claim of public disclosure. However, even where a court finds the list in § 3730(e)(4)(A) to be exhaustive, the court will analyze the circumstances surrounding the alleged disclosure before making a ruling as to whether public disclosure has occurred.³¹⁴

In *Giles*, the court was presented with the question of whether certain disclosures made in legislative documents could bar a qui tam *72 suit.³¹⁵ After an earthquake struck Los Angeles, the city contracted with various debris removal companies.³¹⁶ The city received seventy-five million dollars in advance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) in order to

assist in its clean-up and restoration efforts.³¹⁷ The relator, Diane Giles, was working for the city as an auditor.³¹⁸ During a review of all the invoices submitted by the contractors, she discovered various over-billings and mischarges for debris removal services.³¹⁹ Upon reporting these findings to her supervisor, she was summoned to a meeting with him and the offending contractor.³²⁰ The contractor stated that he knew of other contractors similarly overbilling and that, if disciplined, he would expose everyone else.³²¹ Apparently in an attempt to cover up the misconduct, Giles' supervisors paid the contractor for all work billed and fired Giles.³²²

Following her termination, Giles filed a qui tam action against various defendants including the city.³²³ In defense of the qui tam action, the defendants moved to dismiss her qui tam complaint by arguing that it was barred by public disclosure.³²⁴ As evidence, they pointed to a report by the Public Works Committee to the City Council that stated “[a]t the Committee meeting there were concerns raised regarding allegations by whistleblowers that some of the contractor [sic] were not diligent in utilizing personnel and equipment on the debris removal activities, and that there were even instances of ‘padding’ of the payrolls and equipment usage.”³²⁵ The defendants asserted, “that application of section 3730(e)(4)(A) of the FCA bars the action because the Report by the Public Works Committee constituted a ‘public disclosure’”³²⁶

In considering the merits, the court first held that legislative reports were not listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A).³²⁷ Second, the court *73 distinguished the present case from *A-1 Ambulance*, the case on which the defense relied.³²⁸ The court opined that in *A-1 Ambulance*, unlike the present case, there was extensive public disclosure in an agency proceeding; however, in this case, the report only contained “one meager sentence at the end of the summary, vague suggestions of over billing without implicating specific contractors or government offices.”³²⁹ In this way, the court buttressed its holding by citing the Ninth Circuit's view that “no public disclosure exists where certain wrongdoers are identified and not others.”³³⁰ In the case under consideration, the report contained no information implicating the city or any of the other defendants with regard to overbilling and mischarging.³³¹

Implicit in this court's opinion is the conclusion that legislative documents can constitute public disclosure if they reveal the “allegations and transactions” of the fraud. The underlying tone of the court's opinion seems to suggest that, factually speaking, there just was not enough disclosed to trigger the bar. In light of the court's finding that the list in § 3730(e)(4)(A) is exhaustive, its engagement in a factual analysis of the reported disclosures seems questionable. The court could have stated that since legislative documents are not listed in the section, they cannot constitute public disclosure. The court gave no explicit guidance as to its stance on legislative documents and how they fall within the public domain.

ii. Hearings

Unlike “legislative documents,” hearings are clearly within the statutory text of § 3730(e)(4)(A). Therefore, whenever disclosures are made during Congressional hearings, courts will deem the information publicly disclosed.³³² The case of *Settlemyre* is instructive. In *Settlemyre*, *74 the relator brought suit alleging that the District of Columbia misappropriated federal money allocated for its police department.³³³ However, prior to his qui tam action, a city official had disclosed the inappropriate use of the money during two Congressional hearings.³³⁴ The court found public disclosure articulating, in somewhat of a flawed fashion, that since these disclosures gave the government an opportunity to investigate the city's use of the money, public disclosure had occurred.³³⁵ Under a public disclosure analysis, the critical issue should be whether or not the information has been placed in the public domain, and not whether someone pursued an investigation, the latter more analogous to the statutorily abolished government knowledge bar.³³⁶

e. FOIA

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) is the tool of choice for citizens to obtain information from the government.³³⁷ Unless an exemption applies, any information requested by a citizen through FOIA must be disclosed.³³⁸ Sometimes, a relator will possess information concerning a fraud that was obtained through FOIA. The qui tam attorney must then determine if such information creates a public disclosure problem. Most courts have concluded that information obtained through FOIA constitutes public disclosure.³³⁹

***75** The majority of courts follow the Third Circuit's reasoning in *Mistick*. The relator in *Mistick* made a FOIA request for letters from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) that might contain evidence of fraud.³⁴⁰ The court determined that information disclosed through a FOIA request is public disclosure for purposes of the FCA.³⁴¹ In so holding, the court defined a FOIA request as an “administrative report” for purposes of § 3730(e)(4)(A).³⁴² However, the court ignored the fact that a FOIA request is not listed, and therefore should be excluded pursuant to the statutory text of § 3730(e)(4)(A).³⁴³ Finally, the court strained the reasoning in *Consumer Product Safety Commission* to support its finding.³⁴⁴ In doing so, the court equated a public disclosure under the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”) with a public disclosure under the FCA.³⁴⁵

In light of the statutory history of the CPSA, it is troubling that the *Mistick* PBT court found such comfort and persuasive values in this opinion since the legislative and judicial context of the CPSA was wholly unrelated to the issue before the court. For instance, while the stated purpose of the CPSA stresses a need for broad disclosure, the history surrounding the FCA posits no such need. Indeed, both the legislative and judicial history of the FCA emphasize the need for a broad remedial reading of the statute so that fraud will not go unprosecuted.³⁴⁶ Disturbingly, most courts to consider the issue have joined in the holding of *Mistick*.³⁴⁷ Only an unpublished decision of the Fourth Circuit holds that disclosures under FOIA do not constitute public disclosures under the FCA.³⁴⁸

***76 f. News Media**

Suppose, prior to the filing of the qui tam suit, you discover an article on the front page of the *New York Times* that discloses the fraud of your relator's company. The majority of circuits hold that if the fraud is disclosed in the news media, it will be barred by public disclosure.³⁴⁹ Only two circuits add an additional requirement. Both the Ninth and Second Circuits hold that the relator is barred from bringing his qui tam action unless he had a hand in the public disclosure.³⁵⁰ “This view is rejected as having no basis in the text or legislative history [of the FCA].”³⁵¹ Although this concept seems to parallel the original source rule exception, the adopting two circuits go further and appear to exclude even original sources from whistleblower standing if the matter was already in the public domain.³⁵²

g. Other Issues

Even if a “public disclosure” occurred, the jurisdictional bar is still not triggered unless your suit is “based upon” the public disclosure. Due to the nebulous nature of the phrase “based upon,” there is, not surprisingly, a split among the circuits that labored to carve the contours of the phrase.³⁵³ The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held that a qui tam action should be permitted to proceed unless the allegations in the relator's lawsuit are actually “derived from” a prior public disclosure.³⁵⁴ Under this test, if Mr. Relator was aware of the public disclosure prior to filing his lawsuit and he actually derived ***77** the substance of his action from the prior disclosure, then his suit would be barred.

On the other hand, six circuits have taken the position that “based upon” means “supported by” or “substantially similar to.”³⁵⁵ Under this interpretation, if there is any identity between Mr. Relator's complaint and the content of a prior public disclosure, the jurisdictional bar precludes his lawsuit.

4. Original Source

Even if your suit is “based upon” prior disclosures, Mr. Relator may still recover provided he is an “original source” of the information. The FCA defines “original source” as “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based, and has voluntarily provided the information to the government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.”³⁵⁶ Whether Mr. Relator has “direct and independent knowledge” will depend on the facts of your case. Mr. Relator will have “direct knowledge” if he can show that he had firsthand knowledge of the alleged fraud, and that he obtained this knowledge through his own unmediated efforts.

Recently, the Fifth Circuit in *Laird*, completed a detailed analysis of the “original source” exception to the public disclosure bar.³⁵⁷ James Mayfield, a project specialist, was employed with Lockheed Martin Engineering and Science Company (“Lockheed”) from late 1989 until his termination in 1995.³⁵⁸ One of his responsibilities was to file cost report forms in order for NASA to evaluate Lockheed's expenditures under its engineering contract.³⁵⁹ The contract Lockheed had with NASA required it to certify that it was reporting these cost figures accurately.³⁶⁰ Mayfield discovered Lockheed was inflating its costs reports and he began to report these findings to his *78 supervisors.³⁶¹ Lockheed terminated Mayfield and he filed a wrongful termination suit against them.³⁶² However, the Texas district court granted Lockheed's motion for summary judgment, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed.³⁶³ Mayfield then filed a qui tam action based on Lockheed's inflated cost projections.³⁶⁴ The court granted Lockheed's motion for summary judgment, found public disclosure, and determined that Mayfield was not the “original source” of the information following the filing of his wrongful termination suit.³⁶⁵

As the Fifth Circuit began its analysis of “original source,” it noted that the term “is the subject of much disagreement among the courts of appeals.”³⁶⁶ The court discussed that the original source exception required the satisfaction of a two-part test.³⁶⁷ First, “the relator must demonstrate . . . ‘direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based.’”³⁶⁸ Second, “the relator must demonstrate that he or she has ‘voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing’” the qui tam.³⁶⁹ The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's finding that Mayfield was not the “original source” because he was not working at Lockheed prior to the filing of that qui tam action.³⁷⁰ It found that Mayfield could still qualify as an “original source” without “‘direct’ and ‘independent’ knowledge of each false claim alleged in his complaint.”³⁷¹ Instead, to qualify as an original source, the relator must have direct and independent knowledge of the information “contained in the publicly disclosed material.”³⁷² Since Mayfield was *79 the person that filed the publicly disclosed information, he clearly had independent knowledge.³⁷³ Next, the *Laird* court adopted a plain meaning definition of “direct” knowledge. “We interpret the term ‘direct’ by its plain meaning as knowledge derived from the source without interruption or gained by the relator's own efforts rather than learned second-hand through the efforts of others.”³⁷⁴ As long as Mr. Relator obtained his knowledge independently of the public disclosures and “by his own efforts,” he will be considered an “original source” of the information and the jurisdictional bar will not apply.³⁷⁵

B. Pre-Filing Release

Robert Relator has given you a compelling story about fraud and corruption. He tells you, however, that he previously sued his ex-employer for wrongful discharge, and although there was no public disclosure of the fraud, he signed a release of all future claims. How does the pre-filing release affect the viability of the qui tam suit?

Generally, Robert Relator can settle his independent employment tort case without jeopardizing his subsequent qui tam case.³⁷⁶ Public policy will prohibit enforcing a broad release executed by a relator before a qui tam suit is filed.³⁷⁷ Green, a criminal investigator at Northrop, uncovered fraud, reported it, and was fired.³⁷⁸ Following his wrongful termination settlement for \$190,000, he filed a qui tam action alleging “that the defendants conspired to submit false claims to the United States ‘for costs associated with the procurement of Automated Test Equipment (“ATE”) that Northrop *80 was required to deliver” under a government contract.³⁷⁹ The government declined to intervene, and Northrop attempted to have the suit dismissed based on the release that Green signed when he settled his employment claim.³⁸⁰ The Ninth Circuit concluded that a “prefiling release of False Claims Act (“FCA”) qui tam claims, when entered into without United States' knowledge or consent, cannot be enforced to bar a subsequent qui tam claim.”³⁸¹ Consistent with its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit later enforced a prefiling release as a bar against subsequent qui tam litigation when the government had investigated the false claims allegations and decided not to intervene prior to the signing of the release.³⁸² Under those circumstances, the court ruled that the public interest underlying FCA enforcement by private citizens did not outweigh the public interest of encouraging settlement of private disputes.³⁸³ However, there does seem to be some consensus among the circuits that a prefiling release signed in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding will bar a subsequent qui tam case.³⁸⁴ For now, the extent to which a prefiling release will affect your qui tam case will depend on two variables: (1) what circuit the qui tam case is filed and (2) whether or not the release was signed prior to the government's investigation.

C. Constitutional

1. Standing

Article III, section two of the U.S. Constitution confines federal *81 jurisdiction to the adjudication of “cases and controversies” in which the plaintiff has standing to maintain the suit.³⁸⁵ To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must meet three basic requirements. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “concrete injury in fact” that is not “conjectural or hypothetical.”³⁸⁶ Second, there must be a “traceable connection” between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.³⁸⁷ And third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the requested relief will have a “substantial likelihood” of remedying the injury.³⁸⁸

The first of these three elements, the “injury in fact” requirement, has been a key topic of debate concerning qui tam litigation. In a qui tam case, relators are not “injured” by the defendant's conduct. Rather, the government is the party injured when a defendant commits fraud. The relator's interest in the suit is the percentage he will recover, and it is contingent on the case succeeding. Historically, however, an interest of this kind has been insufficient to establish standing under Article III.³⁸⁹ The Supreme Court resolved this issue on May 22, 2000, in *Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens*.³⁹⁰ In *Stevens*, the Supreme Court, in an attempt to alleviate conflict among the circuits, held that qui tam relators have Article III standing, regardless of their lack of injury.³⁹¹ The Court pointed out that a qui tam relator's interest in the case, although contingent on victory, is still enough to constitute a “concrete private interest in the outcome of the suit.”³⁹² Even though a qui tam plaintiff's rights have not suffered an invasion, the right he seeks to vindicate is enough to satisfy Article III.³⁹³

2. Eleventh Amendment

Finding in *Stevens* that a relator possessed standing, the Supreme Court turned to consider whether a state was a “person” subject to qui tam liability under the FCA and, if so, whether the Eleventh Amendment bars such a suit. Beginning and concluding with the *82 statutory issue, the court applied the “longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign.”³⁹⁴ The court held, “the text of the original statute does less than nothing to overcome the presumption that States are

not covered.”³⁹⁵ However, the Supreme Court has done an about face on the issue of whether local governments are persons. In Cook County the Court held that “[t]he term ‘person’ in section 3729 included local governments in 1863 and nothing in the 1986 amendments redefined it.”³⁹⁶ Although the court in Stevens failed to address the Eleventh Amendment issue and decided the case on purely textual grounds, the court did express in dicta “serious doubt” that the FCA qui tam provisions could pass Eleventh Amendment scrutiny.³⁹⁷ The Cook County Court only addressed whether or not states are immune from suit under the FCA. In a footnote the Court stated:

Indeed, there is some evidence that Congress affirmatively endorsed municipal liability when it passed the 1986 amendments. See S. Rep., at 8 (noting that “[t]he term ‘person’ is used in its broad sense to include partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as States and political subdivisions thereof”) (citing, inter alia, *Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Although in *Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens*, 529 U.S. 765, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), we considered this evidence insufficient to overcome the background presumption that States are not “persons,” in the present case the statement belies the County’s argument that Congress meant to change the contrary presumption applicable to local governments and to remove municipal liability.³⁹⁸

3. Take Care Clause

The Fifth Circuit in *Riley v. St Luke’s Episcopal Hospital*³⁹⁹ has held that the qui tam provisions of the FCA do not violate the Take Care Clause and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers for two separate reasons.⁴⁰⁰ First, the court considered the historical *83 importance of the FCA, and noted that “it is logically inescapable that the same history that was conclusive on the Article III question in Stevens with respect to qui tam lawsuits initiated under the FCA is similarly conclusive with respect to the Article II question” presented by the Riley case.⁴⁰¹ The court opined that the history of the FCA, although not definitive, was a “touchstone illuminating” the qui tam provisions’ constitutionality.⁴⁰² Second, the Fifth Circuit found *Morrison*, the primary case upon which the Riley panel majority relied to analyze the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions of the FCA under Article II, to be inapplicable. According to the court, the Ethics in Government Act, at issue in *Morrison*, assigns an independent counsel to act as the United States itself, while the qui tam provisions merely allow a private citizen to bring a lawsuit in the name of the government.⁴⁰³ In addition, an independent counsel undertakes functions relevant to criminal prosecution, whereas relators are simply civil litigants.⁴⁰⁴ “Thus, because the independent counsel provisions at issue in *Morrison* and the qui tam provisions central to Riley involve two different types of lawsuits, the Executive Branch must wield two different types of control in order to ensure that its constitutional duties under Article II are not impinged.”⁴⁰⁵ Furthermore, the court held “the Executive retains significant control over litigation pursued under the FCA by a qui tam relator.”⁴⁰⁶ Even in cases where the government does not intervene, there are a number of control mechanisms present in the qui tam provisions of the FCA so that the executive nonetheless retains a significant amount of control over the litigation. Specific examples of this control include the government’s power to veto FCA settlements proposed by relators, prerogative to intervene in a FCA lawsuit at any point, unilateral power to dismiss a qui tam suit, authority to request copies of the pleadings and deposition transcripts, and the power to seek alternative relief such as administrative proceedings.⁴⁰⁷ Thus, the court concluded that “[a]ny intrusion by the qui tam relator in the Executive’s Article II power is comparatively modest, especially given the control mechanisms *84 inherent in the FCA to mitigate such an intrusion and the civil context in which qui tam suits are pursued.”⁴⁰⁸ With this opinion, the court has removed the dark cloud of suspicion over qui tam suits in the Fifth Circuit.

4. Eighth Amendment

Once liability is found then the court must determine the proper amount of damages. Generally, one would happily argue that the more horrendous the conduct, the greater the amount of fines the company should have to pay. On its face this seems

like sound reasoning. That is the thinking behind current increases in the statutory penalties. Currently, the range of statutory penalties under the FCA is from \$5,500 to \$11,000.⁴⁰⁹ Legislation has just recently passed that will increase the range of statutory penalties to between \$7,500 and \$15,000.⁴¹⁰ However, there seems to be a judicial specter analyzing these statutory penalties and treble damage awards for constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.⁴¹¹ In *Mackby*, the United States sued the owner of physical therapy facility because he “knowingly caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare between 1992 and 1996 by instructing the clinic's billing company and office manager to use his physician father's Provider Identification Number (“PIN”) on claim forms to bill for physical therapy services provided at the clinic.”⁴¹² His actions resulted in 111 false submissions that cost the government \$58,151.64.⁴¹³ The district court awarded the government \$729,454.92.⁴¹⁴ On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, and ***85** ordered the district court to analyze the fines under the Eighth Amendment.⁴¹⁵ On remand, the district court determined that the fine was not excessive and did not violate the Eighth Amendment.⁴¹⁶ The Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed this determination.⁴¹⁷ Although this analysis has not been accepted in a majority of the circuits, the fact that appellate courts are using it should provide some guidance when computing damages in your qui tam case.

VII. State False Claims Statutes

In addition to the federal FCA, some states have false claims acts of their own. Currently, twelve states have enacted a version of the federal FCA.⁴¹⁸ Of the states that have enacted versions of the FCA, most are broad enough to cover all types of fraud.⁴¹⁹ Only Louisiana and Texas have narrow statutes that only apply to Medicaid.⁴²⁰

In 1995, Texas enacted the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Statute giving the Attorney General the power to investigate and punish those that defraud the Texas Medicaid program.⁴²¹ The objective of the act was to deter fraud on the Medicaid program with consequences such as treble damages, and to provide monetary inducements for private parties, known as relators, who offer ***86** assistance.⁴²² The relator is entitled to a ten to twenty-five percent share of the proceeds of the recovery plus reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs.⁴²³ The Texas statute differs materially not only from the federal statute, but also from most of the false claims statutes of other states.⁴²⁴ Most notably, the Texas statute only covers fraud on Medicaid.⁴²⁵ The federal false claims act and most state false claims acts are much broader and cover fraud perpetrated on the government in any area, not just in the Medicaid arena.⁴²⁶ Also, unlike the federal FCA, which allows relators to proceed without the government, if the Texas State Attorney General declines to take over the suit, the court must dismiss the action.⁴²⁷

It has been seven years since Texas passed its qui tam legislation aimed to recoup fraudulent claims on behalf of the state's Medicaid program.⁴²⁸ As a result, Texas has added more than \$20 million dollars back to its coffers.⁴²⁹ With the assistance of private parties, the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act has provided stiff civil and criminal penalties for those seeking to bilk deceitful gains by making fraudulent claims for reimbursement from the Texas Medicaid program.⁴³⁰ Based on strong statutory remedies, the Texas Medicaid fraud statute has been a success. With the help of the public and private attorneys, Texas has proclaimed its intolerance for fraud against the Medicaid program. Since its enactment, some notable recoveries realized by the state include: \$14.5 million settlement with Driscoll Children's Hospital, \$3.46 million from TAP Pharmaceutical Products, and \$783,500 from Bayer Corporation.⁴³¹ However, in order to mirror the significant recoveries of the federal FCA, Texas should expand on the success of its current act, and broaden it to cover all types of fraud. By increasing the breadth of the statute, the federal government and most states have decreased overall fraud, and increased the government's recovery of losses.⁴³² By following the federal FCA, Texas could have a new weapon against all types of ***87** government fraud and abuse.⁴³³

VIII. Conclusion

The qui tam laws operate as a maze of judicial interpretation and inconsistencies. Evaluating a potential case is complex, and requires a thorough investigation of the facts and law in the appropriate venue. Since many cases can be filed in multiple jurisdictions, it is important to devote a considerable amount of time to analyzing each circuit's interpretation of the FCA. Mastering the intricacies of the FCA is mandatory before embarking on an expensive investigation and litigation process. The rewards though can be most compelling. Diligent and legitimate pursuit of qui tam actions will also result in a heightened quantum of accountability, both for the government and its contractors.

Footnotes

^{a1} Joel M. Androphy has a nationwide practice specializing in white collar crime, qui tam litigation, and civil commercial cases. He recently was lead relator's counsel in a qui tam settlement with Pfizer for \$49,000,000 involving best price issues. He is the author of the treatise "White Collar Crime," 2d edition, a four volume civil and criminal practice treatise by the West Group. Androphy began his career as a law clerk to The Honorable Norman W. Black, late Chief Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of Texas. A long-time participant in bar matters, Androphy currently sits as a member of the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, and was formerly chair of the editorial committee of the Texas Bar Journal, the legal journal of the State Bar of Texas, and editor of the Houston Lawyer, the legal journal of the Houston Bar Association. Androphy has served as President of the Houston Chapter of the Federal Bar Association, as an officer of the Houston Bar Association, and a director of the State Bar of Texas. He has served as an adjunct professor at South Texas College of Law, and the University of Houston Law School, lecturing on white collar crime. He has served on the United States District Court's Merit Selection Committee for U.S. Magistrates, and the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Merit Selection Committee for Public Defenders. He was recently named the distinguished law school alumnus of the year. He is also a member of the Texas and Colorado Bar Associations and has been a partner in Berg & Androphy since 1985. He is a Board Certified Specialist in Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization Foundation (1985, 1996). He has published over thirty legal articles and has spoken at over seventy-five legal seminars. He can be contacted at BERG & ANDROPHY, 3704 Travis, Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 529-5622. The firm also has an office in New York City, 230 Park Avenue. His email address is androphy@bahou.com, and the firm's website is www.bafirm.com.

^{aa1} **Mark A. Correro** is currently a third year law student at South Texas College of Law and law clerk at Berg & Androphy concentrating in qui tam litigation. He was an assistant articles editor for South Texas Law Review for two terms, and is currently an editor for the South Texas College of Law Construction Law Journal. He has received numerous honors and awards including the Professor Barber Distinguished Service Award and the Clements, O'Neil, Pierce, & Nickens award for Best Article on Federal Law. He has also served as an intern for the First Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas. He is a Langdell Scholar at South Texas College of Law and will graduate in May 2004.

Special thanks to Thomas Graham, an associate of Berg & Androphy, for his contributions to the Best Price section of this article, and Mark Kleiman for his editorial contributions to the public disclosure section.

Portions of this article were adapted from an article previously published by the author. See Joel Androphy & Adam Peavy, [Bringing Rogues to Justice, The Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act](#), 65 Tex. B.J. 128 (2002) for an additional discussion on federal qui tam actions.

¹ Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 414 (1899), available at <http://www.bartleby.com/73/1082.html>.

² False Claims Act, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696-99 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000)).

³ [United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York](#), 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

⁴ [United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del.](#), 123 F.3d 734, 738 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the history of the qui tam provisions of False Claims Act).

⁵ False Claims Act, ch. 67, §§ 1, 3, 6 Stat. 696-99 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000)).

⁶ See [United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club](#), 105 F.3d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing the history of the False Claims Act).

- 7 False Claims Act, ch. 67, § 3 Stat. 696-99 (1863) (current version at [31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 \(2000\)](#)).
- 8 False Claims Act, ch. 67, §§ 1, 3, 6 Stat. 696-99 (1863) (current version at [31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 \(2000\)](#)); see also [31 U.S.C. § 3730\(d\)](#); [United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ.](#), 980 F. Supp. 864, 866 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
- 9 False Claims Act, ch. 67, §§ 1, 3, 6 Stat. 696-99 (1863) (current version at [31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 \(2000\)](#)). The term “qui tam” refers to the Latin expression “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hae parte sequitur,” which translates to “he who brings an action for the king as well as for himself.” *Black's Law Dictionary* 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
- 10 [United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del.](#), 123 F.3d 734, 738 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that Congress intended to “offset inadequate law enforcement resources and encouraged ‘a rogue to catch a rogue’ by inducing informers ‘to betray [their] conspirators’”).
- 11 *Id.*
- 12 See [United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club](#), 105 F.3d 675, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing the history of the FCA).
- 13 [United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.](#), 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
- 14 [United States v. Bank of Farmington](#), 166 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing *S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986)*, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267).
- 15 [31 U.S.C. § 3730\(d\)\(1\) \(2000\)](#). As previously noted, under the original FCA the relator was entitled to half of the total recovery. “The most recent incarnation of the Act has reduced this percentage but it still remains substantial.” [Dunleavy](#), 123 F.3d at 738 n.7. Although one might wonder how reducing the relator's potential recovery from half increases incentives to bring a qui tam suit, on balance the new amendments have enhanced the opportunity for recovery. Prior to the 1986 amendments, the court's interpretation of the FCA was a minefield of procedural roadblocks. *S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 10 (1986)*, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269. Since the act was last amended in 1943, several restrictive court interpretations of the act have emerged which tend to thwart the effectiveness of the statute. The Committee's amendments contained in S. 1562 are aimed at correcting restrictive interpretations of the act's liability standard, burden of proof, qui tam jurisdiction and other provisions in order to make the False Claims Act a more effective weapon against Government fraud.
- Id.*
- 16 [31 U.S.C. § 3730\(d\)\(2\) \(2000\)](#).
- 17 See *id.* [§ 3729\(a\) \(2000\)](#). This amount is adjusted each year for inflation and the current range is from \$5,500 to \$11,000. However, a new Senate bill has just passed that will become effective on January 1, 2004, and increases the range to between \$7,500 and \$15,000. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, S. 1, 108th Cong. § 612 (2003). There is a statutory exception to the imposition of treble damages when the defendant makes full disclosure within thirty days of discovery of the violation, and fully cooperates with the government. At the time of disclosure, there cannot be pending any criminal, civil, or administrative action. In such cases, the court has discretion to award not less than twice the damages sustained by the government. [31 U.S.C. § 3729\(a\)](#).
- 18 [31 U.S.C. § 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(A\) \(2000\)](#). If there has been public disclosure of the information, the relator will have to prove that he was the original source. [§ 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(B\)](#). The terms “public disclosure” and “original source” have generated much confusion within the circuits and will be discussed *infra* section VI.A.3.
- 19 [31 U.S.C. § 3730\(c\) \(2000\)](#); see also [United States v. Entin](#), 750 F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
- 20 [31 U.S.C. § 3729\(b\) \(2000\)](#).
- 21 See *id.* [§§ 3731\(b\)\(1\)-\(2\) \(2000\)](#). Under the old statute, an action had to be brought within six years of the date on which the alleged violation was committed. Now, the government, or the qui tam relator acting on his own behalf, must bring the action within six years of the submission of the false claim, or within three years after the government should have learned of the facts underlying the claim, but in no event longer than ten years. *Id.*
- 22 [31 U.S.C. § 3730\(h\) \(2000\)](#).

- 23 Qui Tam Statistics, available at <http://www.taf.org/statistics.html> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 24 Id.
- 25 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2000).
- 26 *United States ex rel. Bagley v. T.R.W. Inc.*, 212 F.R.D. 554, 556 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting *United States ex rel. Woodward v. Country View Care Ctr.* 797 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986)); accord *United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc.*, 1995 WL 812134, at *9 & n.11 (N.D. Okla. 1995); *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc.*, 755 F. Supp. 1040, 1053 (S.D. Ga. 1990). See generally *United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.*, 209 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The FCA aims to advance the twin goals of (1) rejecting suits which the government is capable of pursuing itself while (2) promoting those which the government is not equipped to bring on its own.”). Also, it is a threshold matter, that a relator possess a certain level of actual knowledge about the submission of false claims to the government. This threshold obligation is manifested in the requirement that would-be relators provide to the government material evidence or information in support of their complaints. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). The clear import of this provision is that would-be relators must do more than just assert allegations based on speculation and guesswork. Rather, to qualify for relator status under the Act, would-be relators must be able to provide to the United States evidence and information sufficient to provide a basis for their allegations of fraud. Robert Salcido, *The Government Declares War on Qui Tam Plaintiffs Who Lack Inside Information: The Government's New Policy to Dismiss These Parties in False Claims Act Litigation*, 13 *Health Law* 1, 4 (2000).
- 27 *Bagley*, 212 F.R.D. at 556 (citing *United States ex rel. Made in the USA Found. v. Billington*, 985 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1997)).
- 28 Id. (citing *United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 918 F. Supp. 1338, 1346 (E.D. Mo. 1996)) (“The written disclosure statement should simply contain all the relevant factual information in [the relator's] possession at the time he filed suit.”); *United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co.*, 904 F. Supp. 592, 594 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (explaining that a disclosure statement “is simply a recitation of factual information”); *United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp.*, 824 F. Supp. 830, 838-39 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that the disclosure obligation “requires only a statement of facts,” and concluding that a disclosure statement “should not contain opinions of an attorney”); *United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Intern. Corp.*, 144 F.R.D. 396, 401 (D. Colo. 1992) (stating that a written disclosure statement “contains nothing more than the evidence and information which must come to light in any event once the case proceeds”).
- 29 *Bagley*, 212 F.R.D. at 556 (citing *Made in the USA Found.*, 985 F. Supp. at 608) (explaining that a disclosure statement “should, at a minimum, comprise much of what [the relator] will rely upon to support the contentions in the case at bar While not a prerequisite necessary to satisfy the disclosure requirement, the Court believes more than a mere recitation of facts, available to the government, is required.”) (citations omitted); *Grand ex rel. United States v. Northrop Corp.*, 811 F. Supp. 333, 337 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (acknowledging the possibility that the disclosure statement at issue might contain legal analysis and opinion in addition to facts). This inconsistency is also found in the way different relators' counsel prepare disclosure statements. Eric R. Havian, *Discoverability of Statutory Disclosure Statements and Recovery of Statutory Attorneys' Fees in False Claims Act Qui Tam Cases*, WL N98CFCB ABA-LGLED L-13, L-15 (1998) (opining that some attorneys “prepare very detailed narratives of the evidence, including analysis by counsel of the legal and factual issues in the case and suggestions to the government regarding how to pursue its investigation. Obviously, the government greatly appreciates such efforts, which simplify the task of sorting through an increasing number of qui tam complaints. At the other end of the spectrum, some attorneys simply place a cover sheet on an undifferentiated stack of documents and allow the government to sort it out.”).
- 30 *Bagley*, 212 F.R.D. at 557; see generally Salcido, *supra* note 26 (explaining the pros and cons of filing a full disclosure statement versus a sparse disclosure statement).
- 31 *Bagley*, 212 F.R.D. at 557 (“The statutory purpose of the disclosure requirement, then, is best served by treating disclosure statements in a manner that encourages the relator and his or her counsel to make them as complete, detailed, and thoughtful as possible.”) (citing Havian, *supra* note 29, at L-13).
- 32 The first to file bar is discussed *infra* Part III.B.
- 33 Although the FCA does not limit jurisdiction to federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1355 confers original jurisdiction “exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (2000). Therefore, because the FCA makes individuals who defraud the

government liable “for a civil penalty,” the federal courts seem to have exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., *Stinson, Lyons & Bustamante, P.A. v. United States*, 79 F.3d 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“suit [under the False Claims Act] must be brought in district court”); *LeBlanc v. United States*, 50 F.3d 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“qui tam suits may only be heard in the district courts”). But see, e.g., *Nguyen v. City of Cleveland*, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 646 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (“It is not clear from the text of the statute that federal jurisdiction of whistleblower retaliation claims is exclusive of the states, as Nguyen suggests. Jurisdiction is presumably concurrent. The presumption may be rebutted ‘by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.’ Here, there is no explicit statutory directive and, despite Nguyen’s arguments to the contrary, no unmistakable implication from legislative history. Nor does the Court find a clear incompatibility between state jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction. In any case, although the Supreme Court has restated the rule of *Gulf Offshore*, the only cases in which the Supreme Court has found implied exclusive jurisdiction are the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, ‘where the full extent of [the Court’s] analysis was the less than compelling statement that provisions giving the right to sue in the United States District Court show that [the right] is to be exercised only in a court of the United States.’ Therefore, this Court finds that its jurisdiction over actions brought under § 3730(h) is not exclusive of the state courts.”) (internal citations omitted); *United States ex rel. Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc.*, 860 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating “thus, pursuant to the language of the statute, there is concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and state courts”); *United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc.*, 797 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating “[c]learly, federal jurisdiction is not mandatory under the FCA because the statute does not expressly suggest that jurisdiction shall be exclusive”).

34 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(5), (e)(4) (2000). Most courts have interpreted the “first to file” bar embodied in § 3730(b)(5) as precluding suits, the underlying “material facts” of which have previously been alleged in a separate action. See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.*, 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).

35 See § 3730(e)(4)(A) (This section delineates the public disclosure bar); *Lujan*, 243 F.3d at 1188-89.

36 § 3730(b)(2).

37 *Id.* The written disclosure statement is provided only to the government and is not filed with the court. During this time the complaint, although filed under seal, is not served on the defendant. *Id.*

38 § 3730(b)(3).

[I]t is inevitable that the DOJ will request an extension of the 60 day seal period to permit it to complete its investigation. As stated previously, six months should be the limit, but no more than one year. Six month to a year extensions should only be granted in very unusual situations with the DOJ being required to provide very good reasons for doing so. The court can require the DOJ to obtain an agreement by the relator for the extensions. However, the relator can also protest the extensions to the court. It should not take more than six months for the DOJ to investigate the merits of the allegations and determine whether to intervene. If it does, and many cases have gone on for two to three years under seal, then there is something very wrong and the court should put the DOJ on the hot seat and explain its actions.

Coordination with the Government and the Government Investigation, at [http:// www.quitam.com/potatt4.html](http://www.quitam.com/potatt4.html) (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).

39 § 3730(b)(4)(a).

40 § 3730(b)(4)(b) (The relator can still proceed solo).

41 § 3730(b)(1). The action may only be dismissed after notice and hearing. § 3730(c)(2)(A).

42 § 3730(c)(2)(B). The government may only settle the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances. *Id.*

43 § 3730(c)(1).

44 § 3730(c)(2).

45 *Id.*

46 § 3730(c)(2)(C)(i-iii).

- 47 § 3730(c)(3).
- 48 § 3730(c)(4).
- 49 § 3730(c)(5).
- 50 § 3730(d)(1).
- 51 Qui Tam Issues for Attorneys with Ongoing Actions, at <http://www.quitam.com/barg4.html> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 52 Since the 1986 amendments, qui tam payouts are, on average, ninety-two percent smaller when the government opts not to intervene. W. Jay DeVecchio, Qui Tam Actions: Some Practical Considerations, 28 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 527, 537 (2000).
- 53 Qui Tam Statistics (2002), at <http://www.taf.org/statistics.html> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) (As of January 2004, the government intervened in only 750 of the 3,357 cases filed, not including the 891 cases that are currently under investigation).
- 54 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
- 55 Id.
- 56 Id.
- 57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
- 58 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
- 59 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 229, 232 (1968).
- 60 Id. at 233.
- 61 John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions § 2.01, 2-6 (Supp. 2003). Section 3729(a)(1) creates liability for submitting a false claim and § 3729(a)(2) creates liability for “making or using false records in support of a false claim.” Id. Recoveries under §§ 3729(a)(3)-(6) are much less common. Id. However, section 3729(a)(7) is becoming one of the fastest growing areas of qui tam litigation. Id. § 2.01, 2-39.
- 62 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
- 63 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 598 (1958); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943); United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1926).
- 64 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2000).
- 65 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968); see also United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Richard Dattner Architects, 972 F. Supp. 738, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
- 66 United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F. Supp. 636, 638 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
- 67 United States ex rel. S. Praver & Co. v. Fleet Bank, 24 F.3d 320, 323-24 (1st Cir. 1994).
- 68 Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994). (These cases are based on either an implied or express “false certification” theory, whereby the contractor falsely certifies either contractual or statutory compliance.).
- 69 United States v. Plywood Prop. Assocs., 928 F. Supp. 500, 509 (D. N.J. 1996).
- 70 United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962) (requiring actual knowledge).
- 71 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
- 72 Id. § 3729(b).

- 73 [Id. § 3729\(b\)\(3\); United States v. Oakwood Downriver Med. Ctr.](#), 687 F. Supp. 302, 309 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
- 74 [Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency](#), 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991).
- 75 [United States ex rel. Mazzola v. C.W. Roen Constr. Co.](#), 183 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999); see also [Hagood](#), 929 F.2d at 1421.
- 76 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1131-32 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
- 77 [Id.](#) at 1130-31.
- 78 [Id.](#) at 1129-30.
- 79 [Id.](#) at 1130. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (prohibiting payment for “routine physical checkups”).
- 80 [Lorenzo](#), 768 F. Supp. at 1132.
- 81 [Id.](#)
- 82 [United States v. Adler](#), 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980); see also [United States v. Race](#), 632 F.2d 1114, 1120 (4th Cir. 1980).
- 83 [Adler](#), 623 F.2d at 1289.
- 84 [United States v. Anderson](#), 579 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1978). A good example of the application of the term “falsity” is the case of [United States v. Napco International, Inc.](#), 835 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D. Minn. 1993). In that case, a government contractor purchased American-made military supplies from an Israeli corporation. The government claimed that the Arms Control Export Act required contractors to purchase items from American companies and not from foreign companies. The contractor, however, read the statute to allow procurement from other entities so long as the “items” were of American origin. The court held that because the statute was ambiguous and the defendants reasonably believed that the Export Act did not apply, their claims were not false or fraudulent under the FCA. [Id.](#) at 497-98. Therefore, because Congress decided not to define “falsity” in the 1986 Amendments, the determination of whether the defendant in a particular case submitted a false claim will depend on the court’s interpretation of the statute at issue in a particular qui tam suit.
- 85 The Department of Health and Human Services and The Department of Justice, Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Annual Report 2001, at <http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaa01fe19.htm&number;a> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 86 [Id.](#)
- 87 Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request, 108th Cong. (2002) (statement of Janet Rehnquist, Inspector General).
- 88 “Best price” is defined as the lowest price the manufacturer sells the covered outpatient drug to any purchaser in the United States. When determining the best price, manufacturers must include cash discounts, free goods, volume discounts, and rebates given on the covered drug. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(c)(i)-(iii). However, best price calculations exclude prices charged to Indian Health Service, Veteran Administration, state homes for disabled veterans, Department of Defense, a state pharmaceutical assistance program, the Federal Supply Schedule of the General Services Administration, and any depot prices and single award contract prices as determined by the Government. [Id.](#)
- 89 The key players are: the manufacturer, the wholesaler, the pharmacy, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services and the state Medicaid agencies.
- 90 The most important player is the manufacturer. Under the current system it sells drugs to the wholesaler, calculates the Average Manufacturer Price (“AMP”) and Best Price, submits AMP/Best Price data to CMS, receives rebate invoices from state Medicaid agencies, validates the rebate claims, and then pays the rebates to the state Medicaid agency. It also has the ability to dispute any claimed units sold.
- 91 CMS receives AMP/Best Price data from the manufacturer, tests AMP for reasonableness, calculates the unit rebate amount, and then distributes unit rebate amount data to state Medicaid agencies.

- 92 Each state has its own system in place to handle Medicaid rebates. The state Medicaid agency receives the unit rebate amount data from CMS, receives drug utilization data from pharmacies, calculates the Medicaid rebate due, sends a rebate invoice to the manufacturer, and receives the rebate payment from the manufacturer.
- 93 This could occur when discounts, returns, and seasonal sales cause AMP to calculate lower than Best Price. The manufacturer must report Best Price as equal to calculated AMP.
- 94 Zero or negative AMP cannot be submitted to CMS. The last valid AMP must be submitted.
- 95 When there are no sales in a quarter the manufacturer must use the AMP of the previous quarter.
- 96 If there are no sales in the first quarter marketed, then the sales price of the product must be used.
- 97 Bundled sales refer to the packaging of drugs of different types with the condition that more than one drug type be purchased, or where the resulting discount or rebate is greater than would have been received had the drug products been purchased separately. The sale is contingent upon an additional purchase requirement(s) by the retail purchaser. Valid bundled sales only include drug products that meet the definition of a covered outpatient drug as defined in the drug rebate agreement and statute. Bundled sales will affect the AMP and Best Price calculations. The discounted or contingent drug product's value is proportionately distributed among the other drug products in the bundle. To accomplish correct bundled sales pricing, the following two steps must be completed. Determine the value of the contingent drug product by determining its AMP for the same quarter if it were sold alone. This value is considered a discount, and is proportionately distributed to the other drug products within the bundle. Refigure the AMP/Best Price of the drug products within the bundled sale by applying the value of the discounted/contingent drug product proportionately among the other drug products.
- 98 The CPI-U for each quarter is available at [ftp:// 146.142.4.23/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiat.txt](ftp://146.142.4.23/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiat.txt) (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 99 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Unit Rebate Amount Calculation, at <http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs/drug12.asp> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 100 Office of Inspector General, Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, at <http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/042803pharmacymfgnonfr.pdf> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 101 Boese, *supra* note 61, § 1.06[A].
- 102 Office of Inspector General, Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, at <http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/042803pharmacymfgnonfr.pdf> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 103 *Id.*
- 104 *Id.*
- 105 *Id.*
- 106 *Id.*
- 107 *Id.*
- 108 *Id.*
- 109 *Id.*
- 110 *Id.*
- 111 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (2000).
- 112 This section sets out that the information must be: (1) an unabridged (A) peer-reviewed article that was published in a scientifically sound medical journal (defined by 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aaa-5(5)) or (B) a reference publication that is scientifically sound and (2) is not false or misleading and would not pose a significant risk to the public health. Also, a reference publication is defined as a publication that (1) has not been written, edited, excerpted, or published specifically for, or at the request of, a manufacturer of a drug, (2) has

not been edited or significantly influenced by such a manufacturer, (3) is generally available in bookstores, not just through the manufacturer, (4) does not focus on any particular drug of a manufacturer that disseminates information under § 360aaa of this title, and does not have a primary focus on new uses of drugs that are marketed or under investigation by a manufacturer and (5) is not false or misleading.

- 113 This section sets forth the requirement that a manufacturer submit a supplemental application for a new use along with progress reports and details about the study.
- 114 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (2000).
- 115 Id. § 331(a).
- 116 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(k)(3) (1994).
- 117 Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,093-100 (Dec. 3,1997).
- 118 Id.
- 119 John Munich & Elizabeth Lane, *When Neglect Becomes Fraud: Quality of Care and False Claims*, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 27, 30-31 (1999).
- 120 Id.
- 121 Id. at 36-37.
- 122 945 F. Supp. 1485, 1488-89 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
- 123 Id. at 1488.
- 124 Id. at 1488-89.
- 125 *United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York*, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
- 126 Id.
- 127 *United States v. Neifert-White Co.*, 390 U.S. 228, 230 (1968).
- 128 Id. at 229.
- 129 Id.
- 130 Id.
- 131 Id. at 233.
[T]he False Claims Act should not be given the narrow reading that respondent urges. This remedial statute reaches beyond 'claims' which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money. We believe the term 'claims,' as used in the statute, is broad enough to reach the conduct alleged by the Government in its complaint.
Id.
- 132 *United States v. Van Oosterhout*, 96 F.3d 1491, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
- 133 See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.*, 125 F.3d 899, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1998).
- 134 Id. at 902.
- 135 See, e.g., *Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc.*, 213 F.3d 519, 531-33 (10th Cir. 2000). Invoices submitted by a government photography contractor could be a basis for a FCA claim for the knowing presentation of a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval, even if they only billed the amount called for by a fixed-price contract and the claim did not contain any factual misrepresentations regarding monthly billings or a contractor's request for equitable adjustment. The invoices falsely and impliedly certified that contractor had complied with the contract provisions requiring recovery of silver from photography chemicals. Id.

- 136 Some courts have held that a claim may be “false” because it contains a false certification of statutory compliance, but only when certification of compliance is a condition of payment. See, e.g., [United States ex rel. Wilkins v. North Am. Constr. Corp.](#), 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 624 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
- 137 See generally [United States v. Southland](#), 326 F.3d 669, 676-77 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that if stopping payment is a contractual remedy, the contractor’s continued billing in the face of some defect in performance that is known to the government cannot be a false claim).
- 138 *Id.* at 671-74.
- 139 *Id.* at 672.
- 140 *Id.* at 673.
- 141 *Id.* at 672.
- 142 *Id.* at 673.
- 143 *Id.*
- 144 *Id.* at 674.
- 145 *Id.*
- 146 *Id.*
- 147 *Id.*
- 148 *Id.* at 675-77.
- 149 See Part IV *supra*.
- 150 E.g., [United States ex rel. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc.](#), 317 F.3d 883, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2003); [Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.](#), 183 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1999); [United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.](#), 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he FCA ‘interdicts material misrepresentations made to qualify for government privileges or services.’”) (quoting [United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc.](#), 557 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1977)); [United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala.](#), 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 1997); [United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp.](#), 24 F.3d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir.1994); [United States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp.](#), 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 618-30 (S.D. Tex. 2001); [United States v. Intervest Corp.](#), 67 F. Supp. 2d 637, 646 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (all finding a materiality requirement). But see [United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh](#), 192 F.3d 402, 415 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that there may not be a materiality requirement under the FCA); [United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co.](#), 184 F.R.D. 107, 112 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (finding there is not a requirement of materiality under the FCA).
- 151 [Southland](#), 326 F.3d at 679.
- 152 *Id.* at 679-81.
- 153 *Id.* at 680.
- 154 *Id.* at 681; accord [Costner](#), 317 F.3d at 888 (holding that the government’s knowledge and approval of the “false claims” negates the intent requirement).
- 155 [Southland](#), 326 F.3d at 682; accord [United States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.](#), 305 F.3d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2002); [United States ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW, Inc.](#), 189 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If the government knows and approves of the particulars of a claim for payment before that claim is presented, the presenter cannot be said to have knowingly presented a fraudulent or false claim.”); [United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay](#), 168 F.3d 1013, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1999); [Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency](#), 81 F.3d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The inaptly-named ‘government knowledge defense’ captures the understanding that the FCA reaches only the ‘knowing presentation of what is known to be false.’”); [United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.](#), 71 F.3d 321, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1995).

- 156 [Southland](#), 326 F.3d at 676. The court stated:
The United States does not contend that an abatement of payment by HUD was ever exercised. The central position of the United States in this litigation has been that the claims for housing assistance payments submitted by the Owners during the period covered by the complaint, July 1995 through January 1997, were false claims, i.e., claims for payments to which the Owners were not entitled, because during this period the Owners were in breach of their obligation under the HAP Contract to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing. What this ignores is that the HAP Contract explicitly addresses a breach of this nature and provides a specific remedy: when the Owners are notified by HUD that they have failed to maintain the property in decent, safe, and sanitary condition and that corrective action must be taken within the time specified in the notice, the Owners continue to be entitled to receive housing assistance payments during the corrective action period and until HUD notifies them in writing that they have failed to take the necessary corrective action and that housing assistance payments will be abated. During the corrective action period, then, claims for housing assistance payments are not false claims because they are claims for money to which the Owners are entitled (and which provide the wherewithal both to operate the property and to take the necessary corrective actions).
Id.
- 157 [Godley v. United States](#), 5 F.3d 1473, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
- 158 [Id.](#) at 1476 n.2 (“[T]he court should ordinarily impose the binding stamp of nullity only when the illegality is plain.”). The difference between a contract that is voidable versus one that is void ab initio is knowledge of the wrongdoing. For example, if a contract is awarded to an innocent contractor, without knowledge of illegalities in the bidding process then the contract is voidable. [Id.](#) However, if the contractor was aware of the bid rigging scheme, the contract is void ab initio. [Id.](#)
- 159 Even though courts have held that government contracts predicated on fraud are subject to forfeiture, some question still remains as to whether the defendant will be able to recover in quantum meruit. Some courts have held that where a conflict of interest statute is violated, there cannot be any recovery in quantum meruit. [K. & R. Eng'g, Inc. v. United States](#), 616 F.2d 469, 472-73 (Fed. Cir. 1980). But see [Greg Pelland Const. v. United States](#), 833 F.2d 1022, *1-*2 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (unpublished decision) (stating that because the contractor performed without bad faith and the government accepted the supplies, the contractor was entitled to recover on a quantum valebant basis for the reasonable value in the marketplace of the supplies and services) (citing [United States v. Amdahl Corp.](#), 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and [Urban Data Sys., Inc. v. United States](#), 699 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
- 160 [Godley](#), 5 F.3d at 1475. (citing [J.E.T.S, Inc. v. United States](#), 838 F.2d 1196, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
- 161 [J.E.T.S](#), 838 F.2d at 1200.
- 162 [Id.](#)
- 163 [Id.](#)
- 164 [Id.](#) (citing [United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co.](#), 364 U.S. 520 (1961); [K & R Eng'g Co. v. United States](#), 616 F.2d 469 (1980)).
- 165 [Id.](#) at 1198-99 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1982)).
- 166 [Id.](#) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1982)).
- 167 [Id.](#) (citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-121.13 (1986)).
- 168 [Id.](#)
- 169 [Id.](#) (citing [United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co.](#), 364 U.S. 520 (1961)).
- 170 [Brown Constr. Trades, Inc. v. United States](#), 23 Cl. Ct. 214, 216-17 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
- 171 [Id.](#) at 216.
- 172 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (2000).
- 173 [Erickson ex rel. United States v. Am. Inst. of Biological Scis.](#), 716 F. Supp. 908, 913 & n.10 (E.D. Va. 1989); accord [United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.](#), 931 F.2d 1493, 1494 (11th Cir. 1991). But see [United States ex rel. LaBlanc v. Raytheon Co.](#), 729 F.

- Supp. 170, 175-76 (D. Mass. 1992) (disagreeing with Erickson and stating that all government employees are excluded from bringing qui tam actions).
- 174 Williams, 931 F.2d at 1494.
- 175 Id.
- 176 Id. at 1498. The four exceptions are enumerated in note 180 infra.
- 177 Id. at 1502.
- 178 United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a United States Postal Service employee qualified as “person” under qui tam provision regardless of her status as federal employee, and the fact that her job duties included uncovering and reporting fraud) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) which concluded, in a case filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that “[a] government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant . . . fits comfortably within the statutory term person”); accord Williams, 931 F.2d at 1501; LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20; Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 912-13. But see United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the governmental employee’s “performance of his job responsibilities, including providing to his superiors the information that later formed the basis of these two suits, was not voluntary within the meaning of the False Claims Act”); Werchinski v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 982 F. Supp. 449, 462 (S.D. Tex. 1997); United States ex rel. LaBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170, 175-76 (D. Mass. 1990) (disagreeing with Erickson and stating that all government employees are excluded from bringing qui tam actions).
- 179 Williams, 931 F.2d at 1501; LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20; United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1991); United States ex rel. McDowell v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1039-40 (M.D. Ga. 1991); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 912-13.
- 180 Givler, 760 F. Supp. at 74; Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 912-13. Those four categories are:
Certain actions barred--(1) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought by a former or present member of the armed forces under subsection (b) of this section against a member of the armed forces arising out of such person's service in the armed forces. (2)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under subsection (b) against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive branch official if the action is based on evidence or information known to the Government when the action was brought. (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “senior executive branch official” means any officer or employee listed in paragraphs (1) through (8) of section 101(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.). (3) In no event may a person bring an action under subsection (b) which is based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a party. (4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2000).
- 181 LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 19-20 (disallowing a governmental employee from bringing a qui tam action). But see Williams, 931 F.2d at 1501 (disagreeing with Raytheon); accord United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the “jurisdictional bar of section 3730(e)(4) did not preclude his claim”).
- 182 LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 19-20.
- 183 Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 912-14.
- 184 DeVecchio, supra note 52, at 532.
- 185 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000); United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1999). The “original source” exception to the public disclosure bar is discussed in section VI.A.4 infra.
- 186 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

- 187 See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc.*, 971 F.2d 548, 553 (10th Cir. 1992). But see, e.g., *United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club*, 105 F.3d 675, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This opinion was authored by the same judge that authored the Springfield decision (J. Wald). In *Findley*, J. Wald held that even though the particular facts of the fraud in the case at bar had not been previously disclosed, there had been previous disclosures of this type of fraud, in a 1952 Comptroller General Opinion and that this constituted public disclosure. According to the court this was enough information to reveal the allegation that government employees were improperly maintaining vending machines on federal property. To hold that government possession of knowledge is a bar negates the intent of the 1986 amendments which changed the focus of the jurisdictional bar from mere government possession of knowledge to actual disclosure of the information to the public.
- 188 E.g., *Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States*, 520 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1997) (finding that the public disclosure bar is substantive); *United States ex rel. Feingold v. Administar Fed., Inc.*, 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing *Hughes Aircraft*). But see *United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g and Sci. Servs. Co.*, 336 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the public disclosure bar is jurisdictional).
- 189 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000); see *Koch Indus.*, 971 F.2d at 553.
- 190 *United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.*, 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994); see *United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp.*, 5 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
- 191 See, e.g., *United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc.*, 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1990).
- 192 *Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens*, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); see also *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
- 193 The Fourth Circuit has held that information “based upon” public disclosure is synonymous with information “derived from” the public disclosure. *Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc.*, 221 F.3d 580, 582 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of the public disclosure bar, a “civil hearing” includes the filing of a civil complaint, an “administrative hearing” includes the filing of an administrative complaint, and a putative relator's knowledge is direct if he obtained it through his own exertions, absent any intervening agency. *Id.* at 583. His knowledge is independent if it does not depend on the public disclosure. *Id.* The D.C. Circuit has concocted a formula for when a “public disclosure” has occurred:
 [I]f $X + Y = Z$, Z represents the allegation of fraud and X and Y represent its essential elements. In order to disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the combination of X and Y must be revealed, from which readers or listeners may infer Z , i.e., the conclusion that fraud has been committed.
United States ex rel. Settlemire v. D. C., 198 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting *United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn*, 14 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The Sixth Circuit also employs this formula, and the Eighth Circuit agrees with its basic premise; namely, that the core elements of fraud must be publicly disclosed for the bar to apply. *United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp.*, 160 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 1998); *United States ex rel. Rabushka v. Crane Co.*, 40 F.3d 1509, 1512 (8th Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit has held that a public disclosure is a disclosure that “reveal[s] both the misrepresented state of facts and the true state of facts so that the inference of fraud may be drawn.” *United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh*, 186 F.3d 376, 385 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit has also held that information obtained in discovery, be it filed or unfiled, constitutes publicly disclosed information that will trigger the jurisdictional bar. *United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1158 (3d Cir. 1991). But see *United States v. Bank of Farmington*, 166 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that only discovery actually filed constitutes a public disclosure); *Springfield*, 14 F.3d at 652. While the Fifth Circuit holds that only filed discovery triggers the bar, it also holds that a qui tam action based in any way, in whole or part, on information publicly disclosed is subject to the bar. *Fed. Recovery Serv., Inc. v. United States*, 72 F.3d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit has strictly construed the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A) so as to limit the instances in which the jurisdictional bar will apply. See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.*, 931 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e will not give the [public disclosure bar] a broader effect than that which appears in its plain language.”). For the Second Circuit, the relevant inquiry concerns the “[p]otential accessibility by those not a party to the fraud” *United States ex rel. Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp.*, 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting with approval, *United States ex rel. John Doe v. John Doe Corp.*, 960 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1992)). The Ninth Circuit focuses on “whether the content of the disclosure consisted of the ‘allegations or transactions’ giving rise to the realtor's claim, as opposed to ‘mere information.’” *A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California*, 202 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency*, 81 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996)). Further, so long as the “material elements” of the fraud are in

the public domain, the bar will apply. [A-1 Ambulance, 202 F.3d at 1243](#). Lastly, the First Circuit appears to read the jurisdictional bar narrowly, strictly adhering to and narrowly interpreting the disclosures listed in [§ 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(A\)](#). See, e.g., [LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20](#).

- 194 [A-1 Ambulance, 202 F.3d at 1238](#) (holding that competitive bidding proceedings were “administrative hearings” within the meaning of the FCA).
- 195 [Id.](#) at 1241.
- 196 [Id.](#) at 1242.
- 197 [Id.](#)
- 198 [Id.](#)
- 199 [Id.](#)
- 200 [Id.](#) at 1243.
- 201 [Id.](#) at 1242.
- 202 [Id.](#) at 1244.
- 203 [Id.](#)
- 204 [Id.](#)
- 205 [Id.](#)
- 206 See [Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1473-74 \(9th Cir. 1996\)](#) (finding that no specific allegation of fraud needs to be revealed to bar qui tam suit, so long as the allegations of the fraud are disclosed in an “administrative hearing”).
- 207 [Id.](#) at 1467.
- 208 [Id.](#) at 1473.
- 209 [Id.](#) at 1471.
- 210 [Id.](#) at 1473-74 (citing [United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 966 \(9th Cir. 1995\)](#)).
- 211 [United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614-15 \(E.D. La. 1998\)](#) (holding that a school board meeting where allegations of violations of the FCA occurred was not an “administrative hearing” under the FCA).
- 212 [Id.](#) at 610.
- 213 [Id.](#) at 611-12.
- 214 [Id.](#) at 612.
- 215 [Id.](#) at 614.
- 216 [Id.](#)
- 217 [Id.](#) at 615.
- 218 [Id.](#)
- 219 [Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 582 \(4th Cir. 2000\)](#).
- 220 [Id.](#) at 581.
- 221 [Id.](#)

- 222 Id.
- 223 Id. at 581-82.
- 224 Id. at 582.
- 225 Id.
- 226 *United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman*, 145 F.3d 1069, 1072 (1998) (finding that the allegations of fraud were absent from the IG's publicly disclosed report).
- 227 Id. at 1070.
- 228 Id.
- 229 Id. at 1071.
- 230 Id. at 1072 (citing *United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.*, 72 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1995)).
- 231 Id.
- 232 Id. (internal citation omitted).
- 233 *United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc.*, 99 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996); accord *United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co.*, 99 F.3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996); *United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp.*, 90 F.3d 1514, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1996).
- 234 *Fine*, 99 F.3d at 1001.
- 235 Id. at 1002.
- 236 Id.
- 237 Id. at 1002-03.
- 238 Id. at 1005.
- 239 Id. at 1006 (citing *United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp.*, 90 F.3d 1514, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1996)).
- 240 *United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., Inc.*, 39 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32-33 (D.D.C. 1999).
- 241 Id. at 33.
- 242 Id.
- 243 *Wercinski v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.*, 982 F. Supp. 449, 457-58 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
- 244 Id. at 451.
- 245 Id. at 451-52.
- 246 Id. at 453.
- 247 Id. at 458.
- 248 166 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999).
- 249 Id. at 856.
- 250 Id.

- 251 Id.
- 252 Id.
- 253 Id.
- 254 Id. at 857.
- 255 Id.
- 256 Id.
- 257 Id.
- 258 Id.
- 259 Id. at 862.
- 260 Id.
- 261 Id.
- 262 Id.
- 263 Id.
- 264 Id.
- 265 Id. (quoting [United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc.](#), 99 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996)).
- 266 [Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs.](#), 163 F.3d 516, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1999).
- 267 Id. at 519.
- 268 Id.
- 269 Id. at 520.
- 270 Id.
- 271 Id.
- 272 Id.
- 273 Id.
- 274 Id. at 523-24.
- 275 Id. at 524.
- 276 Id.
- 277 Id.
- 278 [United States ex rel. Phipps v. Comprehensive Cmty. Dev. Corp.](#), 152 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
- 279 Id. at 450.
- 280 Id. at 454.
- 281 Id.

- 282 Id.
- 283 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000) (choosing to list instead criminal, civil, or administrative hearings, Congress did not include prior “civil litigation”); see also *United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc.*, 971 F.2d 548, 554 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Allegations disclosed via civil litigation . . . fall within the scope of public disclosure as contemplated by § 3730.”).
- 284 See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins.*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1157 (3d Cir. 1991).
- 285 *United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng'g, Inc.*, 197 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that a civil complaint constitutes public disclosure); *United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.*, 162 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that allegations in a coworkers prior qui tam complaint constituted public disclosure); *United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp.*, 160 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that relator's prior complaint in a Whistleblower Protection Act suit was public disclosure); *United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.*, 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting relator's argument that “‘hearing’ does not encompass the mere filing of a complaint”); *Koch Indus.*, 971 F.2d at 553-54 (holding that RICO complaint constitutes public disclosure); *Stinson*, 944 F.2d at 1155 (holding that a civil hearing does not need to be a live proceeding); *United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.*, 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that claims raised in a prior RICO filing were public disclosures); *United States ex rel. Foust v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Nat'l Capital Area*, 26 F. Supp. 2d 60, 67-68 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that prior breach of contract suit constituted a “civil hearing,” and thus supported a finding of public disclosure).
- 286 *Siller*, 21 F.3d at 1347.
- 287 Id. at 1340-41.
- 288 Id. at 1340.
- 289 Id. at 1341.
- 290 Id.
- 291 Id.
- 292 Id. at 1350; see, e.g., *United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn*, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994); accord *United States ex rel. Kreindler v. United Tech. Corp.*, 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir. 1993); *United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc.*, 971 F.2d 548, 554 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992); *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1154-56 (3d Cir. 1991).
- 293 *Siller*, 21 F.3d at 1350.
- 294 *Koch Indus.*, 971 F.2d at 553.
- 295 Id.
- 296 Id. at 554.
- 297 Id.
- 298 See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Crescent City E.M.S., Inc.*, 72 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1996).
- 299 Id.
- 300 Id. (quoting *United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.*, 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994)).
- 301 See generally *United States ex rel. Found. Aiding the Elderly v. Horizon West, Inc.*, 265 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the evidence [of public disclosure from the prior civil litigation] failed to expose either the fraud alleged or the transactions underlying that fraud.”); accord *United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus*, 931 F. Supp. 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that to constitute public disclosure, the qui tam action must be based upon the prior litigation).
- 302 See, e.g., *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1991); *United States ex rel. Stone v. Amwest Savings Ass'n*, 999 F. Supp. 852, 856 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that “[l]itigation

disclosures include all filings, and in the absence of a protective order, information obtained during discovery though never filed with the court.”). Traditional discovery requests do not constitute “public disclosure.” *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross*, 55 F. Supp. 1040, 1050 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (“The Court concludes that Congress meant what it said: a ‘hearing’ is some sort of live, relatively formal proceeding before a decisionmaking body, with question of law or fact to be tried. Because Stinson Lyons received the information upon which they based this action through traditional discovery requests in the Leonard litigation, it was not disclosed publicly in a ‘hearing.’ The Court holds that the jurisdictional bar of [Section 3730](#) does not apply in this case.”). But see *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1158 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that disclosure of discovery material to a party who is not under any court-imposed limitation as to its use (such as a protective order) is a public disclosure under the FCA).

303 [United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn](#), 14 F.3d 645, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

304 [Springfield](#), 14 F.3d at 652 (“We do, however, restrict that interpretation to discovery material such as that involved here which is actually made public through filing, as opposed to discovery material which has not been filed with the court and is only theoretically available upon the public’s request.”); [Fed. Recovery Serv., Inc. v. United States](#), 72 F.3d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1995) (The filings in the Louisiana state court suits brought by Priority E.M.S. were “public disclosures” within the meaning of the statute. “[A]ny information disclosed through civil litigation and on file with the clerk’s office should be considered a public disclosure of allegations in a civil hearing for purposes of [section 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(A\)](#).”); [Siller](#), 21 F.3d at 1350. This includes civil complaints. *Id.* at 1350-51.) See generally [U.S. ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng’g and Sci.](#) 336 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2003) (“In response, Congress amended the FCA to bar a court’s jurisdiction over qui tam suits that were “based on evidence or information the Government had when the action was brought.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000)). However, this amendment led to unintended results as it deprived potential relators, who had themselves given valuable information to the government before filing their qui tam action, of an ability to sue under the FCA. See, e.g., [United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean](#), 729 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court had no jurisdiction over a qui tam action brought by Wisconsin based on information of Medicaid fraud the state had uncovered because the state had reported the Medicaid fraud to the federal government before bringing suit). In response, in 1986, Congress amended the Act (to its current form). Specifically, it repealed the “government knowledge” jurisdictional bar and replaced it with the “public disclosure” bar. See [United States ex rel. Rabushka v. Crane Co.](#), 40 F.3d 1509, 1511 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing the purpose behind the repeal as an accommodation of both of the FCA’s goals of promoting private citizen involvement in exposing fraud against the government, and preventing parasitic suits by opportunistic late-comers who add nothing to the exposure of fraud).

305 [United States ex rel. Pentagen v. CACI Int’l](#), 1996 WL 11299, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1996).

306 *Id.* at *8. With regard to the original source rule to be discussed *infra* at VI.A.4, the court stated: Furthermore, the Second Circuit holds that the party divulging the information deemed publicly disclosed by litigation papers, such as depositions, is the original source of that information despite the fact that another party initiated the court proceeding as part of its discovery investigation. Thus, the former AMC official is the original source of the information publicly disclosed by the RDG I deposition. Therefore, Pentagen failed to satisfy the original source requirements of [§ 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(A\)-\(B\)](#) and the court dismisses the first cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.

307 [United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp.](#), 5 F.3d 407, 411-412 (9th Cir. 1993).

308 *Id.* at 409.

309 *Id.*

310 *Id.*

311 See *id.* at 411-12.

312 *Id.* at 412. The DOJ has adopted a policy of forcing relators and their counsel to waive their Barajas rights as a condition of permitting them to look at documents the government obtains. This of course flies in the face of the public/private “partnership” between relators and government, which was clearly contemplated in the FCA’s legislative history. See [Barajas](#), 5 F.3d at 407 (giving a relator the right to amend a qui tam complaint to include new allegations of fraud that were discovered from documents the government had uncovered during its initial investigation).

- 313 See supra note 182 (listing the categories of public disclosure).
- 314 See generally [United States ex rel. Giles v. Sardie](#), 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that disclosures made in a legislative document did not raise the public disclosure bar); see also supra note 182 (describing [§ 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(A\)](#)).
- 315 [Giles](#), 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25.
- 316 [Id.](#) at 1119.
- 317 [Id.](#)
- 318 [Id.](#) at 1120.
- 319 [Id.](#)
- 320 [Id.](#)
- 321 [Id.](#)
- 322 [Id.](#)
- 323 [Id.](#)
- 324 [Id.](#) at 1124.
- 325 [Id.](#) at 1120.
- 326 [Id.](#) at 1124.
- 327 [Id.](#) (finding the list of items in [§ 3730\(e\)\(4\)\(A\)](#) to be exhaustive); accord [United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del.](#), 123 F.3d 734, 744 (3d Cir. 1997); [United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc.](#), 99 F.3d 1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996); [United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp.](#), 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1992); [United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.](#), 931 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1991); [United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.](#), 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990).
- 328 [Giles](#), 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
- 329 [Id.](#)
- 330 [Id.](#) at 1126 (citing [United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs.](#), 163 F.3d 516, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1999); [United States ex rel. Lindenthal v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.](#), 61 F.3d 1402, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1995); accord [Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.](#), 19 F.3d 562, 566 (11th Cir. 1994)).
- 331 [Id.](#)
- 332 See, e.g., [United States ex rel. Settlemire v. D.C.](#), 198 F.3d 913, 918-919 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding disclosures made during Congressional Hearings were public disclosures); [United States ex rel. Ackley v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.](#), 76 F. Supp. 2d 654, 662 (D. Md. 1999) (finding disclosures made during Congressional Hearings were public disclosures).
- 333 [Settlemire](#), 198 F.3d at 916.
- 334 [Id.](#) at 916-17.
- 335 [Id.](#) at 919.
- 336 In [United States ex rel. Merena v. Smithkline Beecham](#), the government took the position that the relator was entitled to a share of only \$60 million, rather than a share of the full \$323 million recovery because the relator had fortuitously “stumbled over” an already existing government investigation that was part of their Labscam initiative. This case has a direct implication for public disclosure analyses. See generally [United States ex rel. Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.](#), 205 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that government's agreement to settle did not waive the government's right to contest relators' share of proceeds).

- 337 See James Roy Moncus III, [The Marriage of the False Claims Act and the Freedom of Information Act: Parasitic Potential or Positive Synergy?](#), 55 *Vand. L. Rev.* 1549, 1574 (2002) (citing Herbert N. Foerstel, *Freedom of Information and the Right to Know: Origins and Applications of the Freedom of Information Act* 44 (1999)).
- 338 *Id.*
- 339 [United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh](#), 186 F.3d 376, 378 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a disclosure pursuant to FOIA does trigger the public disclosure bar); [United States v. A.D. Roe Co.](#), 186 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that disclosure pursuant to FOIA does trigger the public disclosure bar); [United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay](#), 168 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a disclosure pursuant to FOIA does trigger the public disclosure bar); [United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co.](#), 63 F.3d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997); [United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club](#), 105 F.3d 675, 684-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that disclosure pursuant to FOIA does trigger the public disclosure bar). But see [United States ex rel. Bondy v. Consumer Health Found.](#), No. 00-2520, 2001 WL 1397852, at *8 n.2 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2001) (holding that according to the FCA, disclosure under FOIA does not trigger the public disclosure bar).
- 340 [Mistick](#), 186 F.3d at 376.
- 341 *Id.* at 383.
- 342 *Id.*
- 343 See *supra* note 182.
- 344 [Mistick](#), 186 F.3d at 383.
- 345 *Id.*
- 346 [Moncus](#), *supra* note 337, at 1578.
- 347 *Id.* at 1578-79; see also *supra* note 342.
- 348 [United States ex rel. Bondy v. Consumer Health Found.](#), No. 00-2520, 2001 WL 1397852, at *8 n.2 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2001).
- 349 [Wang v. FMC Corp.](#), 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992); accord [United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.](#), 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir.1990). But see [United States v. Bank of Farmington](#), 166 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the additional requirement by the Ninth Circuit that “the qui tam plaintiff herself ‘have had a hand in the public disclosure of allegations that are part of one’s suit’”); accord [United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc.](#), 99 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996); [United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.](#), 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 (4th Cir. 1994); [Cooper v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.](#), 19 F.3d 562, 568 n.13 (11th Cir. 1994); [United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.](#), 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991).
- 350 [Wang](#), 975 F.2d at 1418; accord [Dick](#), 912 F.2d at 16.
- 351 [Bank of Farmington](#), 166 F.3d at 865. Therefore, in a majority of the circuits, even if the media reports a fraud prior to the filing of the qui tam suit, the relator can maintain his cause of action provided he is an original source, which is discussed *infra* VI.A.4.
- 352 [Wang](#), 975 F.2d at 1419.
- 353 Lamenting over the amorphous “based upon” language, one court of appeals commented, “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that the qui tam provision does not reflect careful drafting.” [United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh](#), 186 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1999).
- 354 [Bank of Farmington](#), 166 F.3d at 863-64; [Siller](#), 21 F.3d at 1348-49.
- 355 [Mistick](#), 186 F.3d at 386; [United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare](#), 160 F.3d 326, 332-33 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998); [United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.](#), 19 F.3d 562, 567-58 n.10 (11th Cir. 1994); [United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn](#), 14 F.3d 645, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994); [United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp.](#), 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1994); [United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc.](#), 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992).

- 356 31 U.S.C. § 3730(3)(4)(B) (2000).
- 357 See generally *United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g and Sci. Servs. Co.*, 336 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2003) (construing “original source” of the FCA).
- 358 *Id.* at 348.
- 359 *Id.*
- 360 *Id.*
- 361 *Id.*
- 362 *Id.*
- 363 *Id.*
- 364 *Id.* at 349 n.1.
- 365 *Id.*
- 366 *Id.* at 352.
- 367 *Id.*
- 368 *Id.* (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000)).
- 369 *Id.* (citing § 3730(e)(4)(B)).
- 370 *Id.* at 353-54.
- 371 *Id.* The Laird court noted that the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits take the minority position and hold the relator must have direct and independent knowledge of the information in the complaint to qualify as the original source. *Id.*; accord *United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc.*, 190 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999); *United States ex rel. Mistick v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh*, 186 F.3d 376, 388-89 (3d Cir. 1999); *United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp.*, 5 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
- 372 *Laird*, 336 F.3d at 354. Thus, the Laird court joined the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, the majority, in holding that to qualify as the original source, the relator must have direct and independent knowledge of the information “on which the allegations in the public disclosure are based.” *Id.*; accord *Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp.*, 276 F.3d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002); *United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc.*, 221 F.3d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 2000); *United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club*, 105 F.3d 675, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1997); *United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Tele., Inc.*, 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 1997).
- 373 *Laird*, 336 F.3d at 355 (“As Mayfield is responsible for filing the publicly disclosed information in Mayfield I, it is beyond dispute that dismissal on the basis that his knowledge is not ‘independent’ of the public disclosure . . . would have been in error.”).
- 374 *Id.* (citing Webster's New International Dictionary 640 (3d ed. 1961)); cf *Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists*, 276 F.3d at 1048-49; *Hafter*, 190 F.3d at 1161; *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.*, 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991); *Findley*, 105 F.3d at 690.
- 375 *Laird*, 336 F.3d at 352-56 (construing “original source” of the FCA).
- 376 *United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp.*, 59 F.3d 953, 963-67 (9th Cir. 1995); accord *United States ex rel. DeCarlo v. Kiewit/AFC Enters., Inc.*, 937 F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
- 377 *Green*, 59 F.3d at 963-67.
- 378 *Id.* at 956.

- 379 Id.
- 380 Id. at 956-57. According to the release, Green agreed to:
release, acquit and forever discharge Northrop [and its] employees . . . from any and all claims . . . rights to payment . . . actions and
causes of action of every nature, under any theory under the law, whether . . . statutory or other of any jurisdiction, whether known
or unknown . . . which he had or held, or has or holds, or may claim to have or to hold by reason of any and all matters . . . including,
but not limited to, those arising out of or relating to the Action and/or Green's employment with and separation from Northrop.
Id.
- 381 Id. at 969.
- 382 United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230, 233 (9th Cir. 1997); accord United States ex rel. Chandler
v. Swords to Ploughshares, 1999 WL 144868, *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1999). But see United States ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra,
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (D. Colo. 2002) (characterizing Hall as the exception to the general rule that prefiling releases are
unenforceable on public policy grounds).
- 383 Hall, 104 F.3d at 233.
- 384 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 916 (8th Cir. 2001).
- 385 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471 (1982).
- 386 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
- 387 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
- 388 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
- 389 Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 486-87; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).
- 390 529 U.S. 765, 778 (2000).
- 391 Id.
- 392 Id. at 766.
- 393 Id. at 773.
- 394 Id. at 780.
- 395 Id. at 782.
- 396 Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 123 S. Ct. 1239, 1249 (2003).
- 397 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787.
- 398 Cook County, 123 S. Ct. 1239, 1248 n.10 (2003).
- 399 252 F.3d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 2001).
- 400 Id. at 753. The court further held that the provisions do not violate the Appointments Clause because qui tam plaintiffs are not officers
of the government. Id. Qui tam plaintiffs do not draw a government salary and are not required to demonstrate their fitness for public
employment. Consequently, the court held that the constitutional requirements associated with government offices do not apply. Id.
- 401 Id. at 752.
- 402 Id. at 753.

- 403 Id. at 754-55.
- 404 Id. at 755.
- 405 Id.
- 406 Id.
- 407 Id. at 753-54.
- 408 Id. at 757.
- 409 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000); see also supra note 19.
- 410 The Senate-passed bill text is not yet available, but the Senate-reported bill contained the second House item in Section 911 of the House-passed bill (“relation to false claims act”). The Senate-reported bill also contained the following: SEC. 612: Increase in civil penalties under the False Claims Act. (a) In general-- Section 3729(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking “\$5,000” and inserting “\$7,500”; and (2) by striking “\$10,000” and inserting “\$15,000” (b) EFFECTIVE DATE--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to violations occurring on or after January 1, 2004.
- 411 See generally *United States v. Mackby*, 261 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001) (ordering that the district court re-evaluate the penalties and damages in light of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, which states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII).
- 412 261 F.3d at 824.
- 413 Id.
- 414 Id.
- 415 Id. at 831.
- 416 *United States v. Mackby*, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[I]n sum, the [c]ourt finds that neither the civil penalty nor the treble damage award, either individually or collectively, is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Mackby's violation of the FCA. The [c]ourt therefore concludes that the judgment previously entered in this action does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
- 417 See generally *United States v. Mackby*, 339 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Considering both Mackby's culpability and the harm caused by his offense, we hold that the full \$729,454.92 judgment against Mackby is not grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.”).
- 418 Those states are: (1) California, Cal. Gov't Code § 12650 (West 2004), (2) Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1201 (2000), (3) District of Columbia, D.C. Code Ann. § 2-308.13 (2000), (4) Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.081 (West 2003), (5) Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661-21 (2000), (6) Illinois, 740 Ill Comp. Stat. 1751/1 (2004), (7) Louisiana, L.a. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:437.1 (West 2004), (8) Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 12, § 5B (West 2000), (9) Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 367.010 (1999), (10) Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-101 (West 2003) (general false claims) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-181 (West 2003) (Medicaid only), (11) Texas, Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 36.001 (West 2003) (Medicaid Only) and (12) Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-216.1 (West 2004).
- 419 Boese, supra note 61, § 6-3.
- 420 L.a. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:437.1; Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 36.001; see also Boese, supra note 61, §§ 6.01[K][2], 6.01[J][3].
- 421 John E. Clark, Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Statute: Sharp, New Teeth for the State and Cash Rewards for Relators Exposing Wrongdoers, 65 Tex. B.J. 120, 122 (2002).
- 422 Id. at 122-23.
- 423 Id. at 123.

- 424 [Id.](#) at 122.
- 425 [Id.](#)
- 426 [Id.](#); see also Boese, *supra* note 61, § 6-3-6-7.
- 427 [Clark](#), *supra* note 421, at 123.
- 428 [Id.](#) at 122.
- 429 [Id.](#) at 124.
- 430 [Id.](#)
- 431 [Id.](#)
- 432 [Qui Tam Statistics](#), at <http://www.taf.org/statistics.html> (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
- 433 Recently, the 78th Legislature of Texas failed to act on a pending bill that modeled the federal FCA, and would have expanded the Texas act to cover all types of fraud. Tex. H.B. 400, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).

45 STCLR 23

End of Document

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.